Stanislav Kuznetsov: biography, creativity, career, personal life. Kuznetsov Stanislav Konstantinovich Sberbank reception phone number. Stanislav Kuznetsov: We have accumulated a lot of data about scammers. How does Sberbank develop relations with hackers Kuznetsov

💖 Do you like it? Share the link with your friends

Stanislav Kuznetsov grew up in a military family. Born in Leipzig on July 25, 1962. Has military and legal education. Graduated from the Red Banner Institute of the Ministry of Defense in 1984 and from the Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in 2002, Candidate of Legal Sciences. In addition to Russian, he speaks two foreign languages, Czech and German. Married, father of two daughters.

Currently he is Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank. Owns a share in authorized capital bank and ordinary shares. In between military service and banking activities, he held management positions in the government of the Russian Federation, and was a member of various councils.

Career

Like his father, he began his career with service in the Armed Forces from 1980 to 1998, after which he was transferred to the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. At the time of his dismissal in 2002, he held the position of 1st Deputy Head of the Department and held the rank of colonel.

After leaving service in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he moved to the Ministry economic development and trade of the Russian Federation. Until 2004, he headed the administrative department. From 2004 to 2007 was director of the Department of Administration of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.

2007 is becoming a busy year in the career of Stanislav Konstantinovich. Thanks to the fact that in 2006 the Government allowed ministers to increase the number of deputies to five, in April 2007 Kuznetsov held the position of fifth Deputy Minister of Economic Development. According to Gref, the main task of the fifth deputy will be the implementation of the federal program for the development of the city of Sochi as a resort.

In September 2007, by Presidential Decree, he became a member of the development council physical culture and sports.

In October, Stanislav Kuznetsov was included in the ranks of the commission for the protection of state secrets.

In November, he became a member of the supervisory board of the State Corporation for the Construction of Olympic Venues and the Development of Sochi as a Mountain Resort.

At the beginning of 2008, following his boss German Gref, he resigned on his own initiative from the post of deputy minister. Immediately after this, he holds the post of senior vice president and becomes a member of the board at Sberbank. According to Stanislav Konstantinovich, the transition was not directly related to the Olympics. But working at Sberbank, they both make a great contribution to the preparation for this event.

In October 2010, Stanislav Kuznetsov takes the next step up the career ladder. He, as in the ministry, becomes Gref’s deputy, and holds the post of deputy chairman of the board of Sberbank. While in office, Kuznetsov is responsible for the work of the Administrative Block, coordinates the bank’s security departments, and heads the regional directorate of the cash management center.

In the spring of 2012, Stanislav Kuznetsov became responsible at Sberbank for the Olympic construction, and for a certain period, he was personally present there.

Contribution to the Sochi Olympics

In preparation for such a large and significant project for the country as Olympic Games, many government and commercial structures were involved. Of course, the largest bank in Russia also took part in preparations for this event. Sberbank was not only the general partner of Sochi 2014, but also a co-investor in the construction of the ski jump complex and media village.

After a scandal involving the vice-president of the Russian Olympic Committee due to delays in the preparation of the Olympic village and its facilities, the government shifted responsibility for the construction of the media village to Sberbank. And the Balilov brothers, accused of causing damage to Sberbank, sold their shares in Krasnaya Polyana OJSC, which built the Mountain Carousel tourist complex, and left the country.

Stanislav Kuznetsov was appointed to oversee this area at the bank. He was one of those who had to work, as they say, on the ground. Personal presence was needed in the fall, when it became clear that the contractors were not coping and were not investing in the established deadlines. His responsibilities included communication with the general contractor, as well as with local officials and independent experts.

Kuznetsov had to recruit a team of Sberbank employees to work as superintendents at Olympic venues. Since the bank is not a construction organization, we had to gather people from all over the country from property management departments. At its peak, the size of the task force under Kuznetsov’s command reached eighty people.

Thanks to well-established communication with local construction organizations, Kuznetsov managed not to miss the delivery deadline for the Olympic facilities, even when the Turkish contractor initially chosen by the bank failed.

On the promise control service “Promises.Ru”, you can read the statement of Stanislav Kuznetsov during a period of sharp increases in currency prices and general panic. As deputy chairman of the board of Sberbank, he stated that the bank will not limit the issuance of cash to its customers and will even increase the load on ATMs due to increased demand: “I can firmly state that Sberbank has not introduced any restrictions and does not plan to introduce any. Moreover, we We are ready for this situation of increased public demand for cash and will provide any needs of the population for it, so that people can get everything they want." Also, contrary to some alarmist rumors, it was promised that cooperation with the Visa and MasterCard payment systems would not stop. The promises made by Kuznetsov turned out to be true.

Awards and thanks

Hard work has been recognized many times state awards and thanks. Kuznetsov Stanislav Konstantinovich was awarded the Order of Honor, Friendship, Alexander Nevsky, the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, fourth degree, and certificates of honor from the Government of the Russian Federation and the President. Was awarded gratitude from the President of the Russian Federation.

Stanislav, what trends do you see in banks in terms of cybersecurity? Where are the risks greatest? Where do you see challenges?

— If we are talking about our bank, then I would start with the development of cyber culture and cyber literacy. In this area, we note a strong breakthrough compared to other credit organizations, both in Russia and in other countries of the world. But this is never enough, because cyber culture, cyber hygiene and cyber literacy are areas in which work must be carried out continuously. This will help counteract scammers more effectively: if we have everything in order with cyber literacy, then we won’t need to fight phishing with a set of resource-intensive methods - people will simply know what not to do, what creates a threat. And it will become a habit. The significance of this challenge for us is also that we have to change people’s behavior.

Second challenge: cyber risk management. At Sberbank we talk about the unique reliability of our systems. This means that we take responsibility for managing the risks that fraudsters may pose to our customers. Note that the question is not solely about the bank, the question is about the clients. That is, we go further and talk not only about protecting the bank, but also about protecting clients, because they are part of our system. In this sense, our successes in combating social engineering fraud are indicative. I note that Russian banks and financial organizations find it difficult to cope with this evil. The situation is better in large corporations, but no one has learned to deal with this 100%. After all, when a person of his own free will sends money to a fraudster’s account, and even when he is told that he is a fraudster, but he does not believe it, then in such a situation one cannot speak of one hundred percent effectiveness. However, it is within our power to bring probability to some unique level. Currently, the average accuracy rate for identifying fraudulent transactions is payment systems world class, such as Visa and Master Card, is approximately 85-87%. We have achieved more: our anti-fraud systems that work on technology artificial intelligence, already today have an indicator at the level 96-97%. We have the opportunity to somewhat improve even this high figure, but here, unfortunately, not everything depends on us.

In general, in cybersecurity you should always see the so-called client path, who attacks the client and how. There is very little research on this topic, but we have been keeping records for a year. We are essentially trying to predict threats that may arise tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. And build your own systems that can hedge risks that may arise in a few years. This is a unique work, and, in our opinion, none of our partners or competitors have gone this far.

And third. We are the largest financial corporation in Russia, we are a socially responsible company. We understand that we have areas where we need to help the community. This means that we have a large field of activity in terms of cooperation with our legislators in developing bills and amendments to current legislation. This includes working with law enforcement agencies - how to identify fraud, how to document it. These are also questions related to how the judicial and law enforcement systems should change, which, unfortunately, still follow the development and crimes in the field of high technology. There is a lot to be done here, and our experience is in great demand.

There is a big debate going on right now about whether banks should declare cyber incidents. Of course, from some significant level. Is it worth doing this, in your opinion?

- I think it’s worth it. This is a global practice, and only by understanding your shortcomings can you build something unique in this area and move forward. As for Sberbank, we took this path a long time ago and publicly announced the concept of zero losses in our key systems, zero losses from DDoS attacks for our clients, and so on. In other words, the bank’s activities will not be suspended for a second due to the activities of hackers, moreover, none of the clients will lose funds. This is our KPI, we maintain it, and this is a big job for us.

Second: we are returning to social engineering again - we have something to work on here. We are seeing great challenges in how cybersecurity and cyberculture issues are perceived by others credit institutions who do not want to highlight their losses publicly. Even when filing applications with law enforcement agencies, many try not to talk about the real damage, because this will lead to a decrease in reliability ratings, and this is not a very good signal for clients of a particular bank. There are cases when banks did not report such incidents at all; they simply hid the facts of attacks and theft of funds from accounts - sometimes it is more profitable for them to lose several million dollars than to tell the public about it. And why is this bad? Because without accurate information about the state of affairs and the diagnosis, it is impossible to treat the disease.

What is the concept of cyber protection at Sberbank? Does it provide the required parameters?

— It is important to recognize that now, looking back 4 years ago, we understand that at that time the concept of cybersecurity in Sberbank was very far from any acceptable picture. But we found the strength to admit this fact, to understand that we need to take unpopular measures - change processes 100 percent, invite new people to the team, start virtually from scratch. And move towards creating the best platform in the world. At the same time, we walked around “with our own feet” and looked at the best world practices: in banks, in large technology companies, in fintech. And they understood well how it should be done. We walked this path and finished the work about two years ago. Since then, we have been working in a different coordinate system in terms of reliability and cybersecurity for the bank and for clients. This is a completely different paradigm.

Let me give you a few numbers as an example. Our Cyber ​​Defense Center operates 24/7, and its systems analyze 4.5 billion risk events per day. And this figure is growing due to the fact that the system is becoming “smarter” and sees more and more new threats. Of these 4.5 billion approximately 150-170 events— suspicions of incidents that require “manual processing.”

Stanislav, please tell us about cooperation with BI.ZONE. In what directions will it develop?

— Let's start with the fact that BI.ZONE is a subsidiary of Sberbank. The main areas of activity are, firstly, ensuring the operation of the bank from the point of view of information security according to a special scenario. Second: BI.ZONE, of course, develops its own systems. In particular, the fraud monitoring platform BI.ZONE Cloud Fraud Prevention has been developed and implemented, which is already protecting our subsidiary bank in the Republic of Kazakhstan and in the near future will fully protect Sberbank in Russia. Feedback from customers and a number of cybersecurity experts suggests that this product surpasses what RSA, a leader in its field, offers, and is a benchmark of sorts.

It is clear that the company’s range of interests does not end there - BI.ZONE has a very strong team and unique specialists, there are products and services for a wide variety of areas and industries, which allows it to cover security requests as comprehensively as possible - from cyber intelligence and proactive protection to investigation cybercrimes and evidence preparation. Moreover, the company has even built a cyber risk insurance system. I think BI.ZONE has great potential.

In June we are holding a large-scale conference that has no analogues - no one has done this before. We are talking about Global Cyber ​​Week, which will be held from June 17 to 21 in Moscow, and it will consist of several modules. The first module is OFFZONE, where global cybersecurity stars will present their research and developments in the industry. This event is aimed at technically educated youth. From our point of view, a hacker is not a fraudster, he is a “vulnerability finder.” And the main question for us is: in what direction will he direct his abilities and the information obtained. We would like to motivate young and talented specialists by searching for such vulnerabilities to make not only our systems, but also people’s lives in general safer.

The second module is Cyber ​​Polygon. As part of this event, international training will be held to work out several scenarios of global infection of systems, and various interactions during the attack period, including between banks, will be built here. And of course, all together we will look for ways to save financial systems, customer accounts and their cash. No one had ever conducted such training before.

And the third, key event of Global Cyber ​​Week is the International Congress on Cybersecurity, which will take place on June 20-21, 2019 at the Center international trade. The International Cybersecurity Congress is a unique platform created by us to unite representatives state power, top management from major technology corporations and recognized industry experts for an open dialogue on global cybersecurity issues. In conditions of geopolitical turbulence, such platforms begin to play a special, very important role: for example, the first congress organized PJSC Sberbank with the support of the Association of Russian Banks and ANO Digital Economy, took place in Moscow on July 5-6, 2018 and brought together over 2500 participants, 700 organizations from more than 50 countries. President of Russian Federation INLadimirPutin personally welcomed the guests of the congress with an opening speech. This year the event will become even larger - we are preparing three times as many sessions and reports, organizing discussion tracks parallel to the main program, and significantly improving our partner base. The program is currently being developed and is constantly being updated; this information is already available on the congress website.

What's behindGlobal Cyber Week? Are your ambitions to go international as a cybersecurity player?

— By and large, we have already reached international level. For example, within the framework of the World Economic Forum, we are actively working on the formation of international recommendations in the field of cybersecurity. These things cannot be underestimated - all the high-profile attacks, which have already become textbook, could be neutralized through the tools of international cooperation. Such mechanisms need to be created, and we have room to grow.

02.11.2019

Magomed Bilalov switched the springboard to the “watcher of Sochi” under German Gref

Original of this material
© Slon.ru, 08/14/2013, Bilalov: “For me, obtaining asylum abroad will be a painful decision,” Photo: “Kommersant”

Anton Zhelnov

After President Putin publicly reprimanded the vice-president of the Russian Olympic Committee Akhmed Bilalov for disrupting Olympic construction projects, Bilalov and his brother Magomed big troubles started. The brothers had to leave Russia, Magomed sold his shares in OJSC Krasnaya Polyana (which built the Gornaya Karusel tourist complex) and the National Bank for Business Development. But the Russian investigation wants to reach them abroad as well. On Akhmed Bilalov criminal case started in April, Magomed was charged in July. Last week, the former general director of Krasnaya Polyana, Stanislav Khatskevich, was arrested, and Magomed Bilalov invited investigators to come and question him in London (they refused).

In an interview with Slon, Magomed Bilalov spoke about who he considers to be the initiators of the criminal case against him, why the Olympic facilities have become much more expensive during construction, how he is going to resist the attack of the investigation, and what he will spend the money raised from the sale of his business in Russia on.

Last week, the general director of Krasnaya Polyana, Stanislav Khatskevich, was arrested. Does this mean that your case has passed the point of no return and the investigative actions have entered the active phase?

Considering that we are “colleagues in misfortune,” then, of course, I very much sympathize with Stanislav and other colleagues who have become hostages of this situation. Khatskevich and I have never been friends. Stanislav Kuznetsov brought him to the company (Deputy Chairman of Sberbank - Slon) and introduced it to me. It took him a long time to convince me that we needed him. At that time I was a shareholder and member of the board of directors. I can’t say anything bad about Khatskevich’s work. He left the company because of the scandal, as he refused to sign the documents imposed on him by Kuznetsov, which also raised big questions for me. As far as I know, he never signed anything, no matter how Kuznetsov threatened him. His arrest, as well as the persecution of Elena Reiterer, Sergei Kovalevsky, Alexei Nevsky (ex-general director of North Caucasus Resorts. - Slon) and many other managers, I regard simply as an instrument of pressure. The team of investigators that was sent to pursue us is large. They actively work using the methods available to them. I think it’s even pointless to comment on the fact that these methods are not always legal.

You did not exclude the possibility that you would personally come from London to Moscow for interrogation. Why did you make the opposite decision and now insist on a meeting at the Russian embassy in London?

Now I am undergoing treatment abroad, I have health problems. There was a hypertensive crisis, probably due to the stress of the last five months. The investigators are also aware of this - my lawyers sent everything to them Required documents indicating the diagnosis and the clinic where I am being treated. If investigators really want to establish the truth, then I will answer all questions, and it is not necessary to do this where there is an entrance, but no exit. For example, at the Russian embassy in London. Moreover, the events with Stanislav Khatskevich show that those who call for questioning do not really want to understand, the task is one - to deprive me of the opportunity to defend myself.

- So you will apply for asylum in the UK?

If classic raider actions continue against me, my loved ones and my employees, then I will have to seriously consult with lawyers on this issue. But for me, obtaining asylum abroad will be a painful decision. Problems come out of nowhere and go nowhere. Such traditions Russian business have a centuries-old history. I worked out all the ways and mechanisms of defense with lawyers, and was surprised to learn that in the UK 27 thousand Russians applied for political asylum.

Your brother Akhmed Bilalov is also abroad, although no charges have been brought against him yet, despite checks at the KSK, where he headed the board of directors. Will he also seek asylum?

It is inappropriate for me to comment on anything related to my brother. I can say that his health situation is very difficult: he is forced to devote all his time to this issue for at least a few more months. (Akhmed Bilalov told the media that he was still in mid-2012, but was hospitalized in one of the clinics in Germany two months after the inspection by the president of the Mountain Carousel resort. - Slon).

Let's get back to the charges against you. The investigation believes that you, being a co-owner of the Krasnaya Polyana company - the developer of the Mountain Carousel - through your actions caused damage to another shareholder and creditor of the company - Sberbank. How was the published amount of damage of 45 million rubles calculated?

Where this amount comes from, you need to ask the investigators or those who already brought them ready-made solution in a criminal case. But so that you understand how events developed, let's go back to 2009, when Sberbank decided to build its headquarters at the Gornaya Karusel resort for the 2014 Winter Games. Then the bank allocated a little less than 1 billion rubles for the purchase of its headquarters, which was approximately 70–80% of total amount contract. This was targeted funding: we could not spend this money on other facilities at the resort. At the same time, Sberbank changed the size of its headquarters several times: initially its area was about 8 thousand square meters. meters, then increased to 20 thousand square meters. meters. While the design was underway, we could not start construction. Then it was decided to put these funds on deposit at 7–8% per annum in the National Bank for Business Development. This was the market percentage. Within the agreed period, the entire deposit was returned to Sberbank.

But at the same time, the NBB issued loans to Krasnaya Polyana at an interest rate of 12% per annum. This is another point on which the investigation accuses you.

Loans were issued from the bank's capital long before Sberbank placed a deposit, starting back in 2005. For example, for the purchase of ski lifts for the second stage of the resort. The cost of each such lift is about €15 million. Also, the NBB “Krasnaya Polyana” issued loans to pay taxes and for the development of the company. The NBB, lending to the Olympic site, took a great risk, and the bank's shareholders never received dividends. In this regard, the statements that I, as a co-owner of the NBB, earned 45 million rubles from Sberbank deposits and loans to Krasnaya Polyana are an outright lie. The absurdity of the accusations made for everything banking market obvious. For example, the difference between deposits and loans from the same Sberbank is the same few percent, and to say, for example, that German Gref thus profiting from depositors means calling into question the essence of the banking business.

All these transactions are interested party transactions: they must be approved by the board of directors or general meeting shareholders.

In terms of the size of the transactions we are talking about now, they are within the competence of the board of directors (from 25% to 50% of the value of the company’s net assets). All transactions were agreed upon; Krasnaya Polyana’s documents on receiving loans from the NBB contain the signature of the chairman of the company’s board of directors, Stanislav Kuznetsov, who is also vice president of Sberbank. If any of the shareholders, including the state bank, did not agree with this decision, by law they have the right to protest the transactions within a year, but this was not done. The matter of deposits and loans is within the competence of arbitration courts, but not of law enforcement agencies. But in arbitration courts no one ever contacted.

Investigative measures against you followed criticism from Vladimir Putin, who in February 2013, during an inspection of Olympic construction sites, was extremely dissatisfied with the timing of the construction of ski jumps...

I have it signed by the president of the country certificate of honor: I was given it after the jumps in the “Mountain Carousel” received the FIS - International Ski Federation certificate, and several stages of the Ski Jumping World Cup were held here right on time. We have received the highest marks for the quality of our work. All this happened in 2012. There was no official acceptance certificate for the facility, other than a temporary one, because the Olimpstroy state corporation did not fulfill its obligations. Meanwhile, a temporary permit to put the facility into operation was agreed upon with the Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak. He knew very well that it was not my brother who was involved in the project, but me, as a co-owner of Krasnaya Polyana. Therefore, the subsequent statements by the Deputy Prime Minister regarding “Comrade Bilalov”, when he meant Akhmed, are more than incorrect. My brother never had a share in this project and was not a member of the management bodies. But apparently there's another way to justify getting it non-core asset Sberbank - now worth billions of dollars to him - the speakers on the springboard could not. Moreover, back in May, Vladimir Putin asked Dmitry Kozak at a meeting in Sochi why Sberbank is now the main bank for ski jumps in the country.

- There were also rumors that the springboard was not designed correctly. Were there any mistakes with choosing a location?

The landing site for the ski jumps was chosen by the IOC. As for the talk that something was designed incorrectly or the location is bad, I think this is akin to those fairy tales that the project was not completed on time or was built at an expensive price. The best and most respected experts worked on the project. There were German companies, Norwegians, we were very tightly controlled by Nordby Torgier (FIS expert) and the best Russian experts- Fedorovsky, Kurilo and Kabantsev. They are the most respected design experts. The project passed three state inspections, which also did not reveal any problems. Therefore, I think that before publicly arguing that the ski jump project was “designed as if for the enemy,” you must at least have at least a minimal understanding of construction yourself.

- What led to the rise in price of ski jumps, about which the president also criticized the investor?

The initial cost of this object was 1.8 billion rubles. Then this amount increased to 4 billion rubles. The increase in price was due to increased demands from the FIS and the Organizing Committee of Sochi 2014. All money for construction is from shareholders, some of which was raised in the form of loans. The amount of 8 billion rubles, which is now called the final amount of the springboard, is false, and the president was deliberately lied to. The sports facility itself still costs 4 billion rubles. The same amount is the budget for the creation of protective structures for the ski jumps and the roads to them. The state corporation Olimpstroy was initially responsible for these objects, which was confirmed by documents signed, by the way, by Vladimir Putin. But the state corporation failed, and in order to save the project, Dmitry Kozak decided that it was necessary to forget about government obligations and blame everything on the investor. For me, these funds were unaffordable: I spoke about this to Dmitry Kozak and his people, the same questions were repeatedly raised at meetings with both the president and the prime minister.

But in May 2012, Stanislav Kuznetsov, it turns out, agreed at a meeting with Dmitry Kozak, who has been manually supervising Olympstroy for many years, to build the adjacent infrastructure at the expense of Krasnaya Polyana OJSC, which came as a complete surprise to me. Moreover, this is a major deal, and it never went through corporate approvals, that is, on Kuznetsov’s part it was actually falsified. This was followed by a protocol order from Mr. Kozak to build infrastructure at the expense of Krasnaya Polyana itself. Then Sberbank gained control over the company, becoming the owner of 50% of the shares, that is, it was the main bank of the country that had to pay government obligations. For the project, this meant the end of business.

- You had personal conflict with Dmitry Kozak?

We didn’t have any conflicts with Dmitry Nikolaevich; he sometimes made harsh comments to us. I agreed with some things, and on some issues he agreed with me.

At the beginning of our conversation, you said that a well-planned attack was taking place against you and your loved ones. In whose interests?

I told you several times the name of Sberbank Vice President Stanislav Kuznetsov, who personally oversees the project in Krasnaya Polyana. My brother Akhmed and I have known Stanislav for at least seven years, when he was still head of the department of administrative affairs of the Ministry of Economic Development. I am sure that he, being a retired colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - he is also a member of the Public Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - initiated a criminal case against me. He understands perfectly well that his vigorous activity may raise questions not only from Sberbank President German Gref, but also from depositors and shareholders of the bank.

- What are these questions?

For example, why did Stanislav enter into a general contract with a Turkish company? construction company Sembol. This is precisely where our open conflict with him began. Sembol builds for about $3 thousand per sq. m. meter. I resisted this, explaining to him that our own contractors built for $1.5–1.8 thousand per sq. m. meter. After the state bank gained control of the project, the construction economy plummeted. Annual project estimate, including commercial real estate at the resort, increased from 40 billion to 82 billion rubles. The result is forever unpaid real estate, which today is being built at the expense of depositors of the country's main bank. I do not rule out the possibility of filing lawsuits in international courts against Sberbank structures regarding damage to shareholders by the management of Krasnaya Polyana. For example, at that time there were agreements major transactions without corporate approvals on the direct orders of Kuznetsov. There is enough fundamental evidence for this. I also plan in the near future to send statements to Russian law enforcement agencies about the deliberate infliction of millions of losses on me as a shareholder by the company’s management.

- Suppose there was a reason to squeeze you out of the project. Why then did Ahmed get all the public criticism?

Akhmed is a notable figure: before the KSK, he was in the Federation Council, and even earlier in the legislative assembly of the Krasnodar Territory, and actively worked in the United Russia party. And the general public didn’t really know me until that time. As I understand it, the culprit should have been a person with a well-known name. When the attack on Krasnaya Polyana began and, as a result, Akhmed lost all his posts, the media voiced the reason for what happened. For example, newspapers wrote that Akhmed’s problems began after KSK began to propose to the Russian government to create a special economic zone after the Olympics in Sochi and Krasnaya Polyana, where all facilities built with budget funds could be transferred. According to the media, it was proposed to appoint KSK to manage the zone. Your colleagues concluded that some of the officials, who could have lost control over the situation in Sochi after the Games, framed Akhmed. But I want to believe that this is nothing more than a conspiracy theory. Although now this particular economic zone is being created in Krasnaya Polyana to save the business of Olympic investors.

- You sold your remaining third of Krasnaya Polyana Mikhail Gutseriev, in his own words, for $20 million. Did they point out to you the figure of the co-owner of Russneft?

Our family has known the Gutseriev family for a long time. When we had difficulties, he offered to help. At one time he too faced similar problems. Why Mikhail Safarbekovich needed my Krasnaya Polyana package, I don’t know, but I’m sure he was right. Now about the price for the shares that he paid me. At first, he publicly spoke about $20 million, then, a month later, about $400 million, but in reality the order of the numbers is different. I promised Gutseriev not to disclose the amount.

In May, you also sold your 34.26% of the National Bank for Business Development to the owner of Semenovskaya Manufactory Pavel Kachalov and the founder of Round Lake Denis Baryshev. According to analysts, you could earn no more than 450 million rubles for your package. Is it so?

I don't name the price. The conditions under which I sold my shares in Krasnaya Polyana and the National Bank for Business Development cannot be called market conditions. I received some money - that's already good. [...]

["Kommersant", 04/27/2007, "The police know the purchase of Sochi": The government yesterday published a decree appointing Stanislav Kuznetsov, head of the department for managing the affairs of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, as deputy minister of economic development and trade. Mr. Kuznetsov, Colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, will manage the federal target program development of Sochi for 2006-2014 and control all “Olympic” programs of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade with a total value of 314 billion rubles. [...]
Stanislav Kuznetsov was born on July 25, 1962 in Leipzig, East Germany. In 1984 he graduated from the Military Red Banner Institute of the Ministry of Defense, in 2002 - from the Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Candidate of Legal Sciences, speaks German and Czech. In 1998-2002 he worked in various positions in the International Cooperation Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, holding the rank of colonel. From the position of first deputy head of the department he moved to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, in 2002-2004 he served as head of the administrative department of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, and from 2004 to 2007 he headed the department of administrative affairs of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. [...]
Quite a bit is known about Mr. Kuznetsov himself, despite the fact that Stanislav Kuznetsov accompanies German Gref during most of his visits to the regions and has been present at most open meetings at the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade since 2005, however, in rather small positions. As a source close to Mr. Kuznetsov told Kommersant, he had long been applying for the position of German Gref’s deputy and was even “upset” when Kirill Androsov became deputy head of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.
Kommersant's interlocutor described Stanislav Kuznetsov as a “strong business executive” and expressed confidence that not a single penny in Sochi would be used for other purposes. Let us note that Kommersant sources report that Mr. Kuznetsov was friendly with the ex-head of RosSEZ Yuri Zhdanov. Despite the fact that he came to the department with the same mission, this did not help him retain his post even with the rank of lieutenant general of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - conflicts surrounding control over state investments in Lately have become commonplace. - Insert K.ru]

["Kommersant - Guide Sochi", 09/15/2010, "The Olympics have already begun for us!" :
Guide: You, following German Gref, moved to Sberbank after the IOC decided to hold the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, where you now oversee preparations for the Games. Tell me, was your move to Sberbank connected with the Olympics?
Stanislav Kuznetsov: No, my transition was not directly related to preparations for the Olympics. One stage just ended and another began. Looking back, I’ll be honest: the team led by German Gref at the Ministry of Economic Development was unique and did a tremendous job in just over seven years. Another thing is that Sberbank, as the largest bank in the country and one of the largest in Eastern Europe, of course, could not stay away from such a colossal and important project, How Sochi Olympic Games. It's really national project, around which the whole country is united, and, as it seems to me, not a single one can remain aloof from such a project big company. This is exactly the case when you need to help, participate, build, and take certain risks. As bankers, we love to count money, but now that the whole project is structured, I can say that, from our point of view, it is simply doomed to success. - Insert K.ru]

Recent cyber attacks have shown the vulnerability of corporations and government services to Internet scammers. How to secure funds in your accounts, why it was not possible to immediately recognize and block the spread of the Wannacry virus, why we need a credit cyber history bureau, why a bank needs self-learning android robots, when ATMs that recognize faces might appear, in an interview with RIA Novosti on the eve of the St. Petersburg International Economic Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank Stanislav Kuznetsov spoke at the forum.

Stanislav Konstantinovich, we are meeting on the eve of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. You are a member of the SPIEF organizing committee, and Sberbank always actively participates in its work. What are you going with and what do you expect from the forum in 2017?

This year’s St. Petersburg forum will, it seems to me, be unique, both in terms of the rank of the political establishment and in terms of innovations. It’s very good, because the innovative spirit of the forum has been preserved for many years. Sberbank is preparing a special program for the forum in 2017.

On June 1, Sberbank will hold a plenary session, to which we have invited a stellar cast (I don’t want to name names yet, but these are people who have made technological breakthroughs at the global level). The discussion will be unpredictable, because they feel at their fingertips where the world will go, and this is very important for Russia.

We are entering the pre-election period, and the discussion at the forum can become a platform for discussing new ideas and approaches to the development of the country. It seems to me that many forum participants will use this particular platform to test them.

Of course, we will also hold our traditional Sberbank Night reception, and on June 2 - the Sberbank breakfast. This year its theme is very simple and, probably, the most fascinating of all, because it is connected with what Russia will be like after May 2018. The discussion there is expected to be heated, and will be moderated by German Gref. The interest in participation in the breakfast on the part of all top officials is enormous; the event will be broadcast live.

It is safe to say that the St. Petersburg Forum has its own identity. We will have not just our traditional stand, but also a whole “street” of Sberbank. We invite everyone.

You said that people who will come to the forum will feel at their fingertips how the world is changing. In your opinion, how is the world changing, what technologies are the future and what is Russia’s place in this global chain?

It is very difficult to answer this question unequivocally, but it seems to me that the world is moving towards unique high technologies, the creation of ecosystems, cognitive technologies, and artificial intelligence. And the speed with which this direction is developing is sometimes simply stunning. Russia has huge reserves here, we do not always clearly assess them, sometimes we underestimate them, sometimes we overestimate them. It seems to me that we need to work on these trends more seriously, invest more effort, time and money in their study and development.

Inside the bank, we are now taking a proactive position in introducing new technologies, creating various laboratories and artificial intelligence. But everything is changing at colossal speed, perhaps it does not take years or months. These areas can be fantastically disruptive. As a rule, we talk about the essence of our research, but how much progress we have made in the field of creating artificial intelligence can be judged by talking to our android robots at the Sberbank stand. Today they can answer 90 questions out of 100 and have the opportunity to self-learn. All the software for these robots was written by our programmers. I think that in the future we will be able to commercialize technological developments. For example, we are starting to test the delivery of small cargo by drones. The launch of this project is only a matter of little time.

- How much does Sberbank invest in the development of new technologies?

I will say this: so far, unfortunately, very little. Now a lot depends on the enthusiasts who are passionate about these projects. I am confident that much more needs to be invested to achieve tangible results. We are still at the beginning of the journey.

Do you plan to use facial recognition technologies and other latest developments for everyday use, for example, in ATMs?

My answer is yes. I won’t give details yet, I’ll just say that we have a lot of synergistic ideas, most of which involve non-standard approaches. That is, perhaps we will think about the emergence of new areas that no one has used before, including in banking. But this is a question for the future, for now it is at the level of ideas.

- Is the future measured in decades?

Of course not! We don't have that much time. I think we are talking about a period that is calculated in months. But this direction will definitely be included in our new strategy for 2020, which is now being prepared and will be presented to the supervisory board in the fall.

Today, many countries and companies are investing in so-called identification technologies. This, on the one hand, is the key to reducing many procedures and simplifying interaction with clients; on the other hand, it will completely or almost eliminate any fraud.

Each cyber fraud scheme is based on the fact that a person acts on someone else’s behalf - uses someone else’s card, has a fake certificate, and so on. As soon as we clearly determine both by voice and by appearance that this is our client, a lot of issues will be resolved. In banking, this identification must be close to 100% because we are talking about money. Therefore, today we ourselves are developing such recognition systems, and are also looking for them on the global market. It seems to me that the Japanese have made the most progress in this direction; there are a lot of interesting developments in Israel and Russia.

As for cybersecurity, there is a very good trend in our country - more and more structures and government institutions are beginning to clearly understand the cost of risks. This is good - the more people understand the level of cyber risks, the faster and better we can improve our countermeasures system. This is a big plus. And I have an inner feeling that Russia has huge reserves in this direction. With regard to credit institutions, the policy pursued by the Central Bank is strategically correct. But today we lack the speed of change. A certain monotonous development of the situation does not correspond to the speed of change and the emergence of new cyber risks.

- How to change the situation?

I am in favor of the speedy creation of some kind of technological platform where credit institutions and telecom companies could exchange fraudulent information. Today, unfortunately, there is no such platform at the country level. We do not rule out that it will appear in the near future. Such a platform will reduce the risks of fraud and cyber attacks significantly. Relatively speaking, a counterfeit card of any bank that is blacklisted, in the stop list of the bank itself, tomorrow can be used in Sberbank and in any other bank, and we do not know anything about this stop list. This is actually a cyber history bureau.

The system may contain information on both accounts and fake passports. We raised this problem in Central Bank, we were supported, but the speed of change is extremely slow. We all need to change much faster. We began testing some elements of this system jointly with a number of banks. We have results. I would like to unite quickly to exchange this information.

- Should it be an independent site?

We don’t know yet, but it’s right to do it like a credit history bureau, when everyone participates on the same rights. As for the regulator, there may be different models. It may be inside, but it would be more correct to give the regulator special access; it should see everything, but only control it based on special characteristics. Law enforcement agencies and intelligence services should have special access. I am sure that similar platforms will come to other areas, including industry, and maybe everything will be on a single platform. Today, scammers take advantage of the lack of such tools. Unfortunately, the state, corporations, and small businesses cannot be guaranteed to be protected from cyber fraud. And our country may lose this race if it does not gain required speed changes. This kind of system should be built on the basis of blockchain technology.

- How secure is the blockchain system?

This is a different operating principle. This is the simultaneous registration of the same information for everyone. For example, we all simultaneously had the knowledge that this pen was silver. If you change the information with me, it will remain with you. Any attempts to influence one person are impossible, and changing general knowledge is also impossible. The reliability of these approaches is close to 100%.

How much progress has Sberbank made in preventing the leakage of funds from the accounts and cards of its clients over the past year?

Last week we achieved a unique result: in 97% of cases we detected the fact of funds being withdrawn and stopped the fraud. Our target for this indicator is 94-95% for the year. In the world now this figure is 84-85%. On average, there are five to five and a half thousand fraud attempts against our clients per week. Unfortunately, criminal cases are rarely initiated based on these facts. This worries us greatly.

- Why did this situation arise?

We transfer all materials to law enforcement agencies, but the state currently does not have sufficient tools to initiate cases. Theft from an account was committed, for example, using the method of social engineering: the fraudster persuaded the person to provide his data, it turns out that he provided it himself - it is his own fault. We still do not have the term “cybercrime” in our legislation, there is no glossary of cyber fraud and cyber risks. This just relates to the speed of changes in our legislation

- Is the image of a hacker changing? Are there new countries that are sources of cyber attacks?

Yes, sure. In cyberspace, we close one loophole, and they find another and move on. The task of large corporations is to predict and simulate such situations.

- Last year you said that Russia is the main target for cyber attacks. The situation has changed?

In general, our country still remains the number one target for the whole world. The question is not even about Russian hackers, but about the fact that our legislation today allows cybercriminals to operate quite freely in our space. Most attacks come from the shadow Internet, which is quite difficult to counter.

Give advice to an ordinary Sberbank client who uses social networks, has the Sberbank Online application, makes transactions on the Internet, how to protect themselves?

First tip: do not respond to any calls. If they call you and pretend to be the security service of a bank or call center and tell you the unpleasant news that your card is blocked, but it can be unblocked without coming to the office, provided that you call a certain number, they are definitely scammers. If you receive an SMS telling you to just call the phone and everything will be fine in your life, these are definitely scammers. You need to contact the bank’s call center and make sure that no actions have taken place.

Expert about the “creators” of WannaCry: in the USA they are trying to “draw the fire” away from themselvesAmerican cybersecurity experts believe that the creators of the WannaCry ransomware virus come from the southern regions of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan or Singapore. Expert Leonty Bukshtein commented on these assumptions on Sputnik radio.

Regarding Sberbank Online, the biggest threat is phishing, where scammers can put a similar picture on your computer screen and ask you for passwords and code words, and then send SMS messages. The site has instructions on how to understand whether a picture is a phishing image or not. But if this happens to you, it means you gave scammers your address and access to your computer; This means that scammers are quite confident in navigating your computer. It is necessary to use virus protection means.

Much has been written in our press about the latest Wannacry attack, but this again has to do with hygiene - someone uses old or pirated versions of software, does not install updates that close the gaps, and is careless about cyber culture.

- What did you learn from this attack?

This attack showed that in the world there is no single center cyber threat analysis. If there has been a global spread, then there should be one point in the world where all information about the threat of realized risks flows. If this does not happen, then it will be impossible to stop the threat. I’m not sure about government institutions, but at the level of commercial structures there is definitely no such center now. When commercial companies in Russia suffered a cyber attack, they were given no instructions to forward this information to any one think tank, and no one received any advice on how to proceed. This is very sad and makes us think about urgent measures to hedge these risks.

We behaved completely differently, deciding to face the problem: we were among the first to record the attack, and immediately informed the Central Bank, special services, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs about it. We then spent several hours reviewing all our systems, including those in our subsidiaries, to make sure we were not affected. We turned to those companies that were heavily exposed to such a blow and offered them our help. Personally, I myself called the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MegaFon, and other companies and offered any possible help. Within a few hours, we created a utility that allowed us to identify infected devices and check the infrastructure for the presence of vulnerable hosts. All that night from Friday to Saturday, at least two teams of our cybersecurity specialists traveled to some of the affected companies and helped to minimize the damage in fire mode. We did this, of course, for free.

This attack must be analyzed very carefully at the state level, at the level of intelligence agencies, and at the level of large corporations. We must draw very serious conclusions, because such attacks can be repeated, modified, and we must learn to counter them.

- Is it really possible to find the organizers of Wannacry?

Of course yes! It is the matter of time. Today I am inclined to believe official information. However, the main question is not even the country of origin, but how we detect and counter such attacks. How to put a barrier so that no one gets through it? And now the very hour has come when we can and must do this. And if our country had a common technological platform for cyber risk management, which I spoke about above, then the situation with Wannacry on such a scale would be impossible.


1984 Military Red Banner Institute

Military-political, foreign languages

Officer with higher military-political education, translator-referent

By German language, Czech language translator

2002 Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

Jurisprudence

Candidate of Legal Sciences


WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

30.01.2008

Senior Vice President

WITH

By

organization

job title

1

2

3

4

09.04.2002

23.04.2007

Head of the Administrative Department; Director of the Business Administration Department

24.04.2007

29.01.2008

Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation

Deputy Minister

0

0

0

0

0


0

No


No


No

15. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: MOROZOV ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH, born 1969

1995 Moscow State University named after. M.V. Lomonosov,

Economic theory, economist


WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

12.05.2008



Director Financial management

WITH

By

organization

job title

1

2

3

4

01.10.2001

31.12.2005

Head of the Treasury

01.01.2006

31.05.2007

CJSC "International Moscow Bank"

General Manager, Head of Treasury

02.07.2007

08.05.2008

CB "Renaissance Capital" (LLC)

Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer



0



0



0



0



0


0



No


No


No

16. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: ORLOVSKY VIKTOR MIKHAILOVICH, born 1974

Education information: Higher

1996 Tashkent Electrotechnical Institute of Communications

Automatic telecommunication

Automatic telecommunications engineer

2001 Moscow State University economics, statistics and computer science

Finance and credit

Economist


Positions currently held, including part-time positions:

WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

30.01.2008

Joint-stock commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company)

Senior Vice President

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order):


WITH

By

organization

job title

1

2

3

4

26.11.2001

13.01.2006

OJSC Alfa Bank

Deputy Director for information technology, senior vice president; Director of the Department for Quality Management of Processes and Projects; Director for Development and Support of Products and Operations of the Retail Business Block

16.01.2006

25.01.2008

IBM Eastern Europe/Asia LLC

Deputy Director

Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, market valuable papers or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against government

No

Information about holding positions in management bodies commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

17. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: PESOTSKY VLADIMIR FILIMONOVYCH, born 1940


Education information: Higher

1968 Altai Polytechnic Institute

Industrial and civil engineering

Civil Engineer

1975 Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee


WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

12.09.1991

Altai Bank of the Joint-Stock Commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company)

Chairman

Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0,003%

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0,002%

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

18. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: RYBAKOVA GALINA ANATOLIEVNA, born 1956

Education information: Higher

1978 Moscow Financial Institute

Finance and credit

Economist

Candidate economic sciences




WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

26.10.2000

Joint-stock commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company)

Director of the Branch Relations Department

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order): she has not held any other positions other than the ones she currently holds over the past 5 years.


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0,003%

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0,003%

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

19. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SALONEN ILKKA SEPPO, born 1955

Education information: Higher

1981 University of Helsinki

Regional studies

Regional scientist

Master of Political Science in Economics and Statistics

Positions currently held, including part-time positions:


WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

04.06.2008

Joint-stock commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company)

Deputy Chairman of the Board

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order):


WITH

By

organization

job title

1

2

3

4

30.10.1998

31.01.2007

CJSC "International Moscow Bank"

Chairman of the Board

01.05.2007

30.04.2008

OOO " Management Company Renaissance Capital

The president

Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

20. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SOLOVIEV ALEXANDER KIRILLOVICH, born 1949

Education information: Higher

1973 Voronezh State Pedagogical Institute

High school physics teacher

1982 Voronezh Polytechnic Institute

Economics and organization of the mechanical engineering industry

Engineer-economist


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0,01%

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0,01%

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

21. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SUNDEEV VLADIMIR BORISOVICH, born 1961

Education information: Higher

1984 Leningrad Higher Marine Engineering School named after. Admiral S.O. Makarova

Arctic Faculty, Meteorology

Meteorological engineer

1997 Institute of Retraining and Advanced Training of the Financial Academy

Under the Government of the Russian Federation

Banking

Economist

Positions currently held, including part-time positions (positions held over the past five years):

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order): have not held any positions other than the ones currently held over the past 5 years.


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

22. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SYUKASEV LEONID MIKHAILOVICH, born 1953

Education information: Higher

1974 Sverdlovsk Law Institute

Jurisprudence

Positions currently held, including part-time positions (positions held over the past five years):

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order): have not held any positions other than the ones currently held over the past 5 years.


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

23. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SHCHURENKOV VIKTOR VASILIEVICH, born 1951

Education information: Higher

1976 Kuibyshev Polytechnic Institute

Automation and telemechanics

Electrical Engineer

1997 Samara State Economic Academy

Finance and credit

Economist

Positions currently held, including part-time positions (positions held over the past five years):

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order): have not held any positions other than the ones currently held over the past 5 years.


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0,003%

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0,004%

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

President, Chairman of the Board of Sberbank of Russia – GREF GERMAN OSKAROVICH

5.3. Information on the amount of remuneration, benefits and/or compensation of expenses for each management body of the credit institution - issuer.

No payments were made to members of the Supervisory Board related to 2007 and related to their participation in this management body of the Bank.

Information on existing agreements regarding the payment of income (remuneration): The development of principles and criteria for determining the amount of remuneration for members of the Supervisory Board is within the competence of the Personnel and Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board of the bank. Decisions on the payment of remuneration to members of the Supervisory Board of Sberbank of Russia related to their participation in this management body of the bank are made at the annual general meeting of shareholders of Sberbank of Russia.

At the annual general meeting of shareholders of Sberbank of Russia, which took place on June 27, 2008, a decision was made to pay remuneration to members of the Supervisory Board in the amount of 1 million rubles each with their consent in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

The amount of payments to members of the bank's Management Board for 2007, including wages, monthly and quarterly bonuses, remuneration at the end of 2007 amounted to 891,112,187 rubles.

The amount of payments to members of the bank's Management Board for 2008, accrued in the first half of 2008 and including wages, monthly and quarterly bonuses, amounted to 129,102,619 rubles.

Information on existing agreements regarding the payment of income (remuneration): The development of principles and criteria for determining the amount of remuneration for the President, Chairman of the Board and members of the Board of the bank is within the competence of the Personnel and Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board of the bank. Payment of remunerations and compensations is carried out in accordance with the terms of agreements concluded with the President, Chairman of the Management Board and members of the Management Board of the bank. There is no practice of paying commissions or other property representations to members of the Management Board at Sberbank of Russia.


5.4. Information on the structure and competence of the bodies monitoring the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer.

Control over the financial and economic activities of the Bank is carried out by the Audit Commission, elected by the annual general meeting of shareholders of the Bank for a period until the next annual general meeting of shareholders, consisting of 7 members.

The Audit Commission verifies the Bank's compliance with legislative and other acts regulating its activities, the establishment of internal control in the Bank, and the legality of the Bank's transactions.

The Audit Commission is obliged to:

Conduct an audit of the financial and economic activities of the Bank based on the results of activities for the year, as well as at any time on the initiative of the bodies and persons named in Federal law"On joint stock companies", the Bank's Charter and Regulations on Audit Commission Joint Stock Commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint stock company);

Assess the reliability of the data included in the Bank’s annual report and contained in the annual financial statements Jar.


Information on the system of internal control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer.

Since the formation of the Joint-Stock Commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company), it has had an internal audit service - the Internal Control Service of Sberbank of Russia. As of the reporting date, the head of the Bank's Internal Control Service is Acting. Director of the Department of Internal Control, Audit and Audit - O.V. Chistyakov.

The Bank's Internal Control Service reports to the Supervisory Board, the President, the Chairman of the Bank's Management Board and the Bank's Management Board.

The main functions of this service are:

Checking the completeness of application and effectiveness of the Bank’s methodology for assessing banking risks and banking risk management procedures;

Checking the reliability of the functioning of the internal control system over the use of automated information systems, including monitoring the integrity of databases and their protection from unauthorized access and (or) use;

Verification of accuracy, completeness, objectivity and timeliness accounting and reporting (for external and internal users), as well as the reliability and timeliness of collection and presentation of information and reporting;

  • generalization and analysis of the results of inspections of external control and supervisory authorities, systematization of violations, errors and omissions in the work of the Bank’s divisions identified during inspections, monitoring the elimination of violations, etc.

Information about the availability of an internal document of the credit institution - issuer, establishing rules for preventing the use of official (insider) information.

In accordance with the requirements imposed by the Federal Commission on the Securities Market for professional participants in the securities market, Sberbank of Russia has developed a “List of measures aimed at preventing the misuse of official information when Sberbank of Russia carries out professional activities in the securities market” dated August 20, 2003. No. 1151-r, agreed with the Federal Securities Market Commission on November 11, 2003.

Internet page address: The text of the document is available on the bank's website -


1984 Military Red Banner Institute

Military-political, foreign languages

Officer with higher military-political education, translator-referent

In German, translator in Czech

2002 Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

Jurisprudence

Candidate of Legal Sciences


WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

30.01.2008

Senior Vice President

WITH

By

organization

job title

1

2

3

4

09.04.2002

23.04.2007

Head of the Administrative Department; Director of the Business Administration Department

24.04.2007

29.01.2008

Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation

Deputy Minister

0

0

0

0

0


0

No


No


No

15. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: MOROZOV ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH, born 1969

1995 Moscow State University named after. M.V. Lomonosov,

Economic theory, economist


WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

12.05.2008



Director of Financial Management

WITH

By

organization

job title

1

2

3

4

01.10.2001

31.12.2005

Head of the Treasury

01.01.2006

31.05.2007

CJSC "International Moscow Bank"

General Manager, Head of Treasury

02.07.2007

08.05.2008

CB "Renaissance Capital" (LLC)

Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer



0



0



0



0



0


0



No


No


No

16. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: ORLOVSKY VIKTOR MIKHAILOVICH, born 1974

Education information: Higher

1996 Tashkent Electrotechnical Institute of Communications

Automatic telecommunication

Automatic telecommunications engineer

2001 Moscow State University of Economics, Statistics and Informatics

Finance and credit

Economist


Positions currently held, including part-time positions:

WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

30.01.2008

Joint-stock commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company)

Senior Vice President

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order):


WITH

By

organization

job title

1

2

3

4

26.11.2001

13.01.2006

OJSC Alfa Bank

Deputy Director for Information Technology, Senior Vice President; Director of the Department for Quality Management of Processes and Projects; Director for Development and Support of Products and Operations of the Retail Business Block

16.01.2006

25.01.2008

IBM Eastern Europe/Asia LLC

Deputy Director

Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

17. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: PESOTSKY VLADIMIR FILIMONOVYCH, born 1940


Education information: Higher

1968 Altai Polytechnic Institute

Industrial and civil engineering

Civil Engineer

1975 Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee


WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

12.09.1991

Altai Bank of the Joint-Stock Commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company)

Chairman

Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0,003%

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0,002%

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

18. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: RYBAKOVA GALINA ANATOLIEVNA, born 1956

Education information: Higher

1978 Moscow Financial Institute

Finance and credit

Economist

Candidate of Economic Sciences




WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

26.10.2000

Joint-stock commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company)

Director of the Branch Relations Department

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order): she has not held any other positions other than the ones she currently holds over the past 5 years.


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0,003%

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0,003%

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

19. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SALONEN ILKKA SEPPO, born 1955

Education information: Higher

1981 University of Helsinki

Regional studies

Regional scientist

Master of Political Science in Economics and Statistics

Positions currently held, including part-time positions:


WITH

organization

job title

1

2

3

04.06.2008

Joint-stock commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company)

Deputy Chairman of the Board

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order):


WITH

By

organization

job title

1

2

3

4

30.10.1998

31.01.2007

CJSC "International Moscow Bank"

Chairman of the Board

01.05.2007

30.04.2008

Renaissance Capital Management Company LLC

The president

Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

20. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SOLOVIEV ALEXANDER KIRILLOVICH, born 1949

Education information: Higher

1973 Voronezh State Pedagogical Institute

High school physics teacher

1982 Voronezh Polytechnic Institute

Economics and organization of the mechanical engineering industry

Engineer-economist


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0,01%

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0,01%

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

21. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SUNDEEV VLADIMIR BORISOVICH, born 1961

Education information: Higher

1984 Leningrad Higher Marine Engineering School named after. Admiral S.O. Makarova

Arctic Faculty, Meteorology

Meteorological engineer

1997 Institute of Retraining and Advanced Training of the Financial Academy

Under the Government of the Russian Federation

Banking

Economist

Positions currently held, including part-time positions (positions held over the past five years):

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order): have not held any positions other than the ones currently held over the past 5 years.


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

22. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SYUKASEV LEONID MIKHAILOVICH, born 1953

Education information: Higher

1974 Sverdlovsk Law Institute

Jurisprudence

Positions currently held, including part-time positions (positions held over the past five years):

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order): have not held any positions other than the ones currently held over the past 5 years.


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

23. Last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth: SHCHURENKOV VIKTOR VASILIEVICH, born 1951

Education information: Higher

1976 Kuibyshev Polytechnic Institute

Automation and telemechanics

Electrical Engineer

1997 Samara State Economic Academy

Finance and credit

Economist

Positions currently held, including part-time positions (positions held over the past five years):

Positions held over the past five years, including part-time (in chronological order): have not held any positions other than the ones currently held over the past 5 years.


Participatory interest in the authorized capital of the credit organization - issuer

0,003%

The share of owned ordinary shares of a credit organization - issuer - for a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0,004%

The number of shares of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type) that can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the credit organization - issuer - for the credit organization - issuer that is a joint stock company

0

Participatory shares in the authorized (share) capital (mutual fund) of subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer

0

Shares of owned ordinary shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of a credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of a credit organization - issuer that is a joint-stock company

0

The number of shares of a subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer of each category (type), which can be acquired as a result of the exercise of rights under the options owned by the subsidiary or dependent company of the credit organization - issuer - for subsidiaries and dependent companies of the credit organization - issuer, which is a joint-stock company

0

The nature of any family ties with other persons included in the management bodies of the credit organization - issuer and/or bodies of control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer

No

Information on bringing to administrative responsibility for offenses in the field of finance, taxes and fees, the securities market or criminal liability (conviction) for crimes in the economic sphere or for crimes against state power

No

Information on holding positions in the management bodies of commercial organizations during the period when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against these organizations and/or one of the bankruptcy procedures provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation on insolvency (bankruptcy) was introduced.

No

President, Chairman of the Board of Sberbank of Russia – GREF GERMAN OSKAROVICH

5.3. Information on the amount of remuneration, benefits and/or compensation of expenses for each management body of the credit institution - issuer.

No payments were made to members of the Supervisory Board related to 2007 and related to their participation in this management body of the Bank.

Information on existing agreements regarding the payment of income (remuneration): The development of principles and criteria for determining the amount of remuneration for members of the Supervisory Board is within the competence of the Personnel and Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board of the bank. Decisions on the payment of remuneration to members of the Supervisory Board of Sberbank of Russia related to their participation in this management body of the bank are made at the annual general meeting of shareholders of Sberbank of Russia.

At the annual general meeting of shareholders of Sberbank of Russia, which took place on June 27, 2008, a decision was made to pay remuneration to members of the Supervisory Board in the amount of 1 million rubles each with their consent in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

The amount of payments to members of the bank's Management Board for 2007, including wages, monthly and quarterly bonuses, remuneration based on the results of 2007, amounted to 891,112,187 rubles.

The amount of payments to members of the bank's Management Board for 2008, accrued in the first half of 2008 and including wages, monthly and quarterly bonuses, amounted to 129,102,619 rubles.

Information on existing agreements regarding the payment of income (remuneration): The development of principles and criteria for determining the amount of remuneration for the President, Chairman of the Board and members of the Board of the bank is within the competence of the Personnel and Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board of the bank. Payment of remunerations and compensations is carried out in accordance with the terms of agreements concluded with the President, Chairman of the Management Board and members of the Management Board of the bank. There is no practice of paying commissions or other property representations to members of the Management Board at Sberbank of Russia.


5.4. Information on the structure and competence of the bodies monitoring the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer.

Control over the financial and economic activities of the Bank is carried out by the Audit Commission, elected by the annual general meeting of shareholders of the Bank for a period until the next annual general meeting of shareholders, consisting of 7 members.

The Audit Commission verifies the Bank's compliance with legislative and other acts regulating its activities, the establishment of internal control in the Bank, and the legality of the Bank's transactions.

The Audit Commission is obliged to:

Conduct an audit of the financial and economic activities of the Bank based on the results of activities for the year, as well as at any time on the initiative of the bodies and persons named in the Federal Law "On Joint Stock Companies", the Charter of the Bank and the Regulations on the Audit Commission of the Joint Stock Commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint stock society);

Assess the reliability of the data included in the Bank’s annual report and contained in the Bank’s annual financial statements.


Information on the system of internal control over the financial and economic activities of the credit organization - issuer.

Since the formation of the Joint-Stock Commercial Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (open joint-stock company), it has had an internal audit service - the Internal Control Service of Sberbank of Russia. As of the reporting date, the head of the Bank's Internal Control Service is Acting. Director of the Department of Internal Control, Audit and Audit - O.V. Chistyakov.

The Bank's Internal Control Service reports to the Supervisory Board, the President, the Chairman of the Bank's Management Board and the Bank's Management Board.

The main functions of this service are:

Checking the completeness of application and effectiveness of the Bank’s methodology for assessing banking risks and banking risk management procedures;

Checking the reliability of the functioning of the internal control system over the use of automated information systems, including monitoring the integrity of databases and their protection from unauthorized access and (or) use;

Checking the accuracy, completeness, objectivity and timeliness of accounting and reporting (for external and internal users), as well as the reliability and timeliness of collection and presentation of information and reporting;

  • generalization and analysis of the results of inspections of external control and supervisory authorities, systematization of violations, errors and omissions in the work of the Bank’s divisions identified during inspections, monitoring the elimination of violations, etc.

Information about the availability of an internal document of the credit institution - issuer, establishing rules for preventing the use of official (insider) information.

In accordance with the requirements imposed by the Federal Commission on the Securities Market for professional participants in the securities market, Sberbank of Russia has developed a “List of measures aimed at preventing the misuse of official information when Sberbank of Russia carries out professional activities in the securities market” dated August 20, 2003. No. 1151-r, agreed with the Federal Securities Market Commission on November 11, 2003.

Internet page address: The text of the document is available on the bank's website -

Sberbank has completely rebuilt its cybersecurity system to use artificial intelligence to protect clients’ money and information from hackers who are using increasingly sophisticated methods of theft. How to protect money from cyber fraudsters, about black lists of clients, “white” and “red” hackers, cooperation with the FSB and Interpol, robotization, reconfiguring ATMs to accept new banknotes and the construction of a “smart city” in Moscow in an interview with RIA Novosti, the Deputy Chairman of the Board spoke Sberbank Stanislav Kuznetsov. Elena Medvedeva and Gulnara Vakhitova spoke.

IN new year holidays people traditionally relax and let down their guard. What recommendations could you give to our readers on how to protect their funds from scammers and hackers?

First, we never call and tell our clients that their card will be suspended in an hour or two, so they need to take some action. If you receive such calls (they happen, unfortunately), then this is definitely the work of scammers.

My recommendation is simple - you need to hang up and call the call center back. It will give you exactly what is going on. Secondly, if you receive SMS messages that your card will be blocked and you are asked to call back on such and such a phone number, then know that Sberbank does not send such messages.

Next, you can see from which number SMS messages are coming. There are scammers who camouflage themselves with bank numbers. Therefore, I recommend that you always carefully look at what number you are receiving SMS from.

How does Sberbank itself protect itself from hackers?

The first is the protection of the bank itself, the second is the protection of clients from attempted attacks. All clients who have our application on their phone are protected from viruses that can steal money through mobile devices. We use an anti-virus program that, without the client noticing, updates protection against any viruses in the world.

In terms of protection, we have gone even further: even if scammers call you, posing as officials or sending you SMS messages about closing an account or card with an offer to make a counter call, we have learned to identify such transactions.

So if our client voluntarily transfers information to fraudsters, including passwords, then using certain specially developed artificial intelligence techniques and analytical measurements, we today hedge about 97% of such risk on the client’s part. This means that 97% of people from whom fraudsters stole money, Sberbank has learned to return the money back, that is, we do not allow it to be cashed out and transferred to the fraudster’s account.

How does Sberbank deal with hackers?

There are bad ones, but there are also good hackers - "white" and "red" - who look for and help eliminate vulnerabilities. We have our own teams of "white" and "red" hackers. They specifically test our systems - both openly and covertly. We put this on an industrial scale, at the stages before implementation, during implementation and after. These are the requirements of modern standards. We must stay ahead of the "innovative" attempts of bad hackers and create the right protection at home.

- How many “white hat” hackers does Sberbank have?

This is a small division, which includes highly qualified cybersecurity specialists.

- How does the bank cooperate with law enforcement agencies in the field of cybersecurity?

The level of our interactions with both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB today is very high. We recently held a meeting with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the new head of the BSTM (Bureau of Special Technical Measures), General Mikhail Litvinov, and discussed joint information exchange activities that could lead to a serious reduction in crime and fraudulent activities in our country. We have accumulated a lot of data about scammers. We expect concrete and very effective work by the operational units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of our country to apprehend such criminals. The scale is growing, this needs to be done.

Sberbank also cooperates with Interpol in the field of cybersecurity...

We have a bilateral agreement with Interpol, within the framework of which we exchange information and conduct practical cooperation. In particular, about a month and a half ago, Interpol approached us with a request to help in investigating a fraudulent subnet that came within their visibility area. Four specialists from our subsidiary "Bizon" as part of the Interpol Global Complex For Innovations group helped to unravel this criminal network in a few days, discovered criminals in China, and passed on all the significant information to Interpol employees, who used it to carry out operational activities.

- How many criminal cyber groups are there in Russia, in your estimation?

According to our calculations, there are about 800-900 scammers across the country today who engage in crimes on an ongoing basis using social engineering methods. But these are only the ones we see.

How do hackers operate?

They introduce viruses into software that steal information, supply false documents, and control operating systems. The last group of viruses is the most modern and the most dangerous. When such a virus is installed in the operating system of a credit institution, it can drain all of its funds.

- Do you expect an increase in hacker activity?

We are always ready for this. In 2017, we repelled about 40 large DDoS attacks on the bank, but we don’t see much intensification. All of our security perimeters detect any activity in this area in advance. We, in principle, today have learned to defend ourselves against this type of attack.

- How can you assess the situation on the market? What losses do Russian banks suffer from hackers?

The losses are colossal. If we talk about Sberbank, then in 2017 our cybersecurity service stopped more than 300 thousand attempts to steal funds from individuals and legal entities damage amounting to more than 20 billion rubles was prevented, both directly using social engineering methods and using virus software. For comparison: in 2016, attempts to steal in the amount of about 16 billion rubles were prevented.

Did Sberbank suffer any losses from hackers in 2017?

We have zero losses in the bank, this is our KPI. This task was set before us by the board of the bank, and all the processes that are being built in the bank today are aimed at completely eliminating this possibility. At the same time, for various reasons, we have learned today to detect attacks on our clients and partners. In such cases, we immediately warn the companies, the FSB and the Central Bank.

We are also completing the creation of a special platform that will protect banks and companies from any attempted attacks. In February-March we plan to launch a full-scale cyber insurance business. The cost of this service has not yet been discussed, but we will offer the market several products in this area.

Does Sberbank encounter counterfeit banknotes at ATMs? In particular, with the new denominations of 2000 and 200 rubles?

As for banknotes with a new denomination, we have never recorded any counterfeits. In some cases, very rarely, we fix glued banknotes.

Five thousandths mostly?

Basically yes. They appear in specific ATMs, and we are interacting with manufacturers who currently accept protective measures. In a very small proportion of ATMs today, manufacturers have not yet installed additional security measures in the settings.

- How has Sberbank prepared to accept new banknotes of 200 and 2000 rubles?

In the pre-New Year period, we decided not to reconfigure ATMs.

- So that there are no failures?

So that there is no drawdown in the readiness of the ATM network. This is a coordinated position with the Central Bank, and, in fact, other banks have made the same request, according to our information. At the same time, the new banknotes are accepted everywhere, and in January we will basically complete the reconfiguration of all self-service devices for them.

By the end of January, the reconfiguration for new banknotes will already be 100%?

According to our calculations, about 90%. The remaining 10% are distant regions. We will complete this process during January. There are some regions where specialists must be transported by plane.

- What are the reasons for failures in transactions using Sberbank cards in December?

Today we are carrying out a colossal transformation, creating new infrastructure products and implementing them. We have a lot of systems; apparently, some mistakes were made during new implementations, and this is the price of the speed of change. For each failure, a special investigation is carried out.

If a failure occurs, our situation center records the stop of some process, the number of calls to the call center increases and the reason is established. Next, the system is transferred to a backup version of operation. We call it stand-in. This happens very quickly. Everything is transferred to another phase, and clients should not guess that we have any deviations. In your understanding, failures are when “everything stopped,” but in our understanding, failures are when the speed of service, or transactions, or some other indicator deviated by a percentage. We monitor any quality metrics for our transactions.

Will the launch of the first stage of the new Data Processing Center in Skolkovo help prevent failures?

Undoubtedly. So that you understand what “first stage” is - these are four modules out of five. These are the main design decisions.

- How actively is Sberbank involved in the robotization process?

A robotics laboratory has opened at Sberbank, we have very big plans. Now we are developing in this direction in different directories: it includes both android and non-android robots.

- How realistic is it to replace people in call centers and branches with robots?

© Photo: provided by the press service of Sberbank Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank Stanislav Kuznetsov

© Photo: provided by the press service of Sberbank

The point is not that robots will stand at the cash register and serve customers, we have opportunities to robotize our processes. For example, in Odintsovo we are now completing the creation of a very small office in mall, in which the most modern technologies using these approaches. There will be no classic cash register - customers will receive money through self-service devices. If you need to talk to our employee manager, you can go to the appropriate device, press a button, and you will see a pretty girl who will answer any of your questions. There will be employees there who will help people get used to new technologies.

Assistants like Siri or Alice do not yet fully understand people. After all, you're talking about something like that?

For now we are talking about a living person who will sit on the other side of the screen. She will be able to work in Vladivostok, Kaliningrad, and Moscow.

- When will Sberbank actively start using drones?

We are carrying out this work on different directions, our drones will be multifunctional, and we are optimistic about the future.

- How does the bank solve the problems of clients who are mistakenly blacklisted on suspicion of money laundering?

There is a problem. But our analysis shows that out of a hundred such companies, only a few come across by chance. We have a compliance department, where specialists check and in a very short time, literally in two or three days, make a decision to unblock the account if it is a decent and conscientious client. We consider this policy to be correct: the risks are very high, and both legal entities and individuals may suffer from this.

Now many companies are building new modern complexes, and their management is moving there. Does Sberbank have such plans?

We are seriously considering the implementation of the Smart City project (smart city - editor's note) on a plot of 460 hectares of land along Rublevskoye Highway in Rublevo-Arkhangelskoye, which belongs to Sberbank. Over the next year, we will take active steps to implement it. The decision to move Sberbank management there has not yet been made. After all, it takes one and a half to two years to design a building, and another two to three years to build it. But we do not exclude the possibility that we will eventually move there.

This will be the implementation of the most modern developments, a comfortable working and living environment. We have already signed a decree from the Moscow government on the implementation of this project on the river bank. There will be a metro, kindergartens, schools - all of this is on a completely new level. Now, together with the Moscow City Hall, we are creating the infrastructure of the complex.

- What is the cost of this project?

We don't think this is a very expensive project. We have a payback point, we have had test negotiations with all the major construction companies, and they are all very interested in participating. There is already a plan for the planning of the territory; it is approved by a decree of the Moscow government. It was developed by the winners of the competition - a company from Germany.

The traditional "Green Marathon" of Sberbank, which is held at the end of May 2017, took place in partnership with charitable foundation Natalia Vodianova "Naked Hearts" in Moscow. What will happen in 2018?

We have already started preparing the next “Green Marathon”, for us this is a big and required project. I personally ran 1211 kilometers this year.

We are close to the logic, ideology, and politics of the Naked Heart Foundation, and we associate this project with this foundation.

In 2018, we will not hold it in Moscow on the territory of Moscow State University; now we are waiting for a decision to start on Vasilyevsky Spusk. We also want to definitely hold this marathon in all major Russian cities, the exact number is currently being clarified.

The topic of cybercrime has been firmly on the agenda in the past year. There have been loud accusations against Russia of interfering in the US election process. Concerns have been raised about possible cyber attacks on the nation's largest banking systems. Much of this could be prevented or stopped in the early stages, provided that all interested parties carried out prompt information exchange about recorded attacks. Until recently, Russia remained a passive participant in the exchange of information on cybercrimes due to the lack of appropriate domestic legislation. Stanislav Kuznetsov, Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank, spoke about the results of the discussion of this topic by participants at the World Economic Forum in Davos in an interview with TASS.

- Stanislav Konstantinovich, as part of your agenda at the forumwhat results were achieved on the first day, what remains to be done?

Yesterday we discussed the topic of cyberterrorism in the digital age and the risks that accompany it, today we discussed concrete steps to exchange information. Cybercrime is transnational, and for each country separately it is completely pointless to organize separate investigations, which will definitely lead to a dead end due to a lack of expertise. Today, the “Guidelines for organizing the exchange of information on ensuring cybersecurity” was tentatively signed. These are recommendations prepared for almost all public government agencies and private companies around the world. In fact, these are recommendations addressed to the entire world community.

- Who are you talking to in in this direction and what is Russia's role in the agreement?

The meetings I had today with executive director UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Jean-Paul Laborde, as well as general director Europol and one of the heads of the Interpol cybersecurity center in Singapore, show that there is a great desire on their part to cooperate and exchange information. Russia is now unable to fully participate in information exchange, since it has not ratified the only international legal instrument regulating this process, the 2001 European Convention on Cybercrime. Its provisions on the right to investigate on the territory of other countries raise understandable concerns among our law enforcement agencies. We discussed the possibility of clarifying and supplementing them, taking into account what is currently happening in the world and the peculiarities of our legislation, and our lawyers see good prospects for joining the convention.

Banking system Russia was attacked not by people, but by several tens of thousands of so-called Internet things - equipment that has access to the Internet, even irons

There were also pessimistic statements concerning mainly bureaucratic barriers that are characteristic of the whole world. In Europe and the USA they have even more powerful roots than ours. But I look into the future with great optimism.

- We are talking about countering international cyber terrorism at the global level, but if we touch on the topic of our legislation, what needs to be improved here to reduce the damage from cybercrime?

The most important thing is that our legislation today does not contain the term “cybercrime”, which the whole world has been using for a long time. To our great regret, there is not yet such a legal term as “theft from an electronic account.”

We are taking too long to adapt our legal tools, while in the extremely rapidly changing world of cybercrime we need to have tools for even faster response changes. But if earlier we simply talked about this, then last year we had more and more active supporters in law enforcement agencies, various ministries and departments who understand the need to bring legislation into line with the tasks of ensuring protection against cyber threats at the national level.

- What exactly was done?

A draft amendment to Article 158 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation has been submitted to the State Duma ("Theft" -Note TASS), which introduce a crime such as “theft of funds from an electronic account.” Another bill was also introduced in December regulating relations related to strategic infrastructure (package of bills “On the security of critical information infrastructure (CII) of the Russian Federation.” - TASS note). It lays the foundations for a systemic fight against cybercrime. Comments on it must be collected by the end of January.

Because Russia is now target No. 1, where target No. 1, in turn, is Sberbank

Need new organization interaction between government institutions and large commercial structures that are accumulating today a large number of cybercrime data. The ability to exchange such information in a timely manner will allow us to quickly build protection for those who lack the relevant competencies. For example, at Sberbank we have developed Huge experience on countering DDoS attacks (distributed denial of service attack. -Note TASS), including understanding them technical features. The attacks carried out in November were unique even by world standards. The Russian banking system was attacked not by people, but by several tens of thousands of so-called Internet things - equipment that has access to the Internet, even irons.

- Sounds like a sci-fi spy movie.

This, unfortunately, is already a reality. The layered protection system of large credit institutions held up, but a number of banks were forced to suspend work in order to “regroup.” This is life, we must prepare for this, and prompt exchange of information with us about the features of each specific attack is something that is in demand not only by Russian, but also by foreign colleagues. Because Russia is now target No. 1, where target No. 1, in turn, is Sberbank. We have experience that we are ready to share, including within the framework of the Davos Forum.

Obviously, attacks from the Internet of things will be more widespread. Unfortunately, the theft of information will continue - both personal, commercial and official, including information about developments, through the distribution of phishing emails

For example, when in December federal Service Security Service (FSB) warned of possible attacks on the Russian financial system, she made it clear that she sees the features of these attacks and understands who is preparing them and from which centers. This message played a key role in preventing damage. We got a lot back then technical information, which was instantly transferred to the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other banks did the same. Her comprehensive analysis allowed us to draw several conclusions, which the FSB also spoke about. The first is that the attacks were carried out from distributed servers different countries. Therefore, one cannot talk about the “authorship” of a particular country: it is just one or another location of the servers. Another conclusion was related to the fact that if not the organizers, then the command center (these are different things) of the alleged attack could be located on the territory of Ukraine. These statements were based on a detailed analysis of widely varying information received by the FSB from financial institutions.

- What trends and main threats do you think will be relevant this year, and what components of the technological infrastructure will need to be adapted in order to successfully cope with this?

A good question, the answer to which must begin with the recognition of the fact that, unfortunately, we are still late. Cybercrime is growing much faster than cyberdefense. And this is a tribute to the times, which dictates demands for changes within ourselves, in the system, in the country as a whole.

The main threats will come from traditional attacks and DDoS attacks. They will definitely continue, their technical implementation will change - in order to select ways to bypass the protection. Obviously, attacks from the Internet of things will be more widespread. Unfortunately, the theft of information will continue - both personal, commercial and official, including information about developments, through the distribution of phishing emails. (The attackers send emails, which look like mailings from popular brands, bank notifications, or messages within social networks and through instant messengers. Users open the links they contain, click on pictures, banners -and infect the computer or mobile phone a virus that “steals” information that allows attackers to gain access to funds in accounts. -Note TASS).

The area that generates the greatest risks is the development of viruses that allow attackers to gain access to control the IT systems of various companies. They are aimed, as a rule, at financial companies, but now we are very close to the emergence of similar risks for the IT systems of enterprises in other industries, including the energy, aviation, defense and nuclear industries. I know of cases where hackers, trying to steal money, accidentally entered the control systems of dispatch services...

- Wow, "by chance".

This really was not their goal, but if you imagine that someone could do this purposefully, it becomes clear that the adoption of a law on cyber protection of the Russian infrastructure is absolutely necessary. In addition, hackers will continue to look for holes in banks' IT systems that use outdated technology, such as chipless, single-stripe cards, older ATM models, or outdated software.

- We talked about technology, but there is also the human factor.

Yes, and in Russia, probably more than anywhere else, crimes committed using “social engineering” methods are widespread. Attackers gain the trust of clients, and they provide them with passwords to accounts in online banking systems, PIN codes for cards and other information. The most vulnerable category is the elderly. They trust people who call them on the phone, introduce themselves as social security services, Pension Fund, government agencies and even the security service of Sberbank and talk about some kind of failure, loss of data, which allegedly created a threat to lose the money stored in the bank. The message of the criminals is “Right now, urgently dictate the data to us, and everything will be fine with you again.” In this case, it is necessary to hang up without remorse, no matter who the person who called appears to be, and immediately call back to the bank’s call center, where they will always tell you what is happening, what to do in this situation, and, if necessary, strengthen protection and save your money.

- If we talk about specific figures characterizing Sberbank’s results in the field of cyber protection, what are you ready to announce now?

Since we cannot expect a sharp increase in vigilance among older clients, we have created a fraud monitoring center that monitors abnormal activity and prevents attempts to withdraw money. On average, we record about five thousand such incidents a week, and after the crime has actually been committed, we record and quietly return up to 400 million of the withdrawn money to clients’ accounts. We prevented about 14 billion rubles in losses, but this is not 100% of incidents, but 95–96%. It is impossible to achieve one hundred percent efficiency here, but we show the maximum: on average in the world the return is 82–84%. For the remaining 4–5%, we are conducting an investigation. If we see that the damage is due to at least partial shortcomings on the part of Sberbank employees or imperfections of our IT systems, we always return the money. At the same time, as a result of deliberate unlawful actions of employees, not a single ruble left the clients’ accounts.

We have also achieved a complete absence of interruptions in the operation of the bank’s systems during DDoS attacks, thanks to the created layered defense system. The year before last, stoppages ranged from 50 minutes to several hours; last year we saw 0 minutes of stoppage of any of the internal systems.

- To sum it up -When will the number and damage curve of cybercrimes go down?

When will law enforcement agencies have the tools to prosecute such acts. It is no secret that practically no criminal cases are brought against the crimes we prevent, since there are no legal grounds for a systematic fight against them. Amendments to the Criminal Code, combined with a common database of incidents and relevant expertise, will create such a basis. We can identify scammers and stop them, we see their phones, we know their numbers bank cards and customer telephone numbers, but automated channels for the exchange of this information between banks, telecoms, and law enforcement agencies have not yet been developed. It is necessary to create a closed database where all, including negative, information about such operations will be collected.

Attackers gain the trust of clients, and they provide them with passwords to accounts in online banking systems, PIN codes for cards and other information. The most vulnerable category is the elderly

It is also very important that we and our clients live in the same information field, in the same rules of cyber culture, when we just need to stop or at least check calls with messages about various emergencies.

We talked Andrey Korzin and Maria Rumyantseva

Magomed Bilalov switched the springboard to the “watcher of Sochi” under German Gref

Original of this material
© Slon.ru, 08/14/2013, Bilalov: “For me, obtaining asylum abroad will be a painful decision,” Photo: “Kommersant”

Anton Zhelnov

After President Putin publicly reprimanded the vice-president of the Russian Olympic Committee Akhmed Bilalov for disrupting Olympic construction projects, Bilalov and his brother Magomed big troubles started. The brothers had to leave Russia, Magomed sold his shares in OJSC Krasnaya Polyana (which built the Gornaya Karusel tourist complex) and the National Bank for Business Development. But the Russian investigation wants to reach them abroad as well. On Akhmed Bilalov criminal case started in April, Magomed was charged in July. Last week, the former general director of Krasnaya Polyana, Stanislav Khatskevich, was arrested, and Magomed Bilalov invited investigators to come and question him in London (they refused).

In an interview with Slon, Magomed Bilalov spoke about who he considers to be the initiators of the criminal case against him, why the Olympic facilities have become much more expensive during construction, how he is going to resist the attack of the investigation, and what he will spend the money raised from the sale of his business in Russia on.

Last week, the general director of Krasnaya Polyana, Stanislav Khatskevich, was arrested. Does this mean that your case has passed the point of no return and the investigative actions have entered the active phase?

Considering that we are “colleagues in misfortune,” then, of course, I very much sympathize with Stanislav and other colleagues who have become hostages of this situation. Khatskevich and I have never been friends. Stanislav Kuznetsov brought him to the company (Deputy Chairman of Sberbank - Slon) and introduced it to me. It took him a long time to convince me that we needed him. At that time I was a shareholder and member of the board of directors. I can’t say anything bad about Khatskevich’s work. He left the company because of the scandal, as he refused to sign the documents imposed on him by Kuznetsov, which also raised big questions for me. As far as I know, he never signed anything, no matter how Kuznetsov threatened him. His arrest, as well as the persecution of Elena Reiterer, Sergei Kovalevsky, Alexei Nevsky (ex-general director of North Caucasus Resorts. - Slon) and many other managers, I regard simply as an instrument of pressure. The team of investigators that was sent to pursue us is large. They actively work using the methods available to them. I think it’s even pointless to comment on the fact that these methods are not always legal.

You did not exclude the possibility that you would personally come from London to Moscow for interrogation. Why did you make the opposite decision and now insist on a meeting at the Russian embassy in London?

Now I am undergoing treatment abroad, I have health problems. There was a hypertensive crisis, probably due to the stress of the last five months. The investigators are also aware of this - my lawyers sent them all the necessary documents indicating the diagnosis and the clinic where I am being treated. If investigators really want to establish the truth, then I will answer all questions, and it is not necessary to do this where there is an entrance, but no exit. For example, at the Russian embassy in London. Moreover, the events with Stanislav Khatskevich show that those who call for questioning do not really want to understand, the task is one - to deprive me of the opportunity to defend myself.

- So you will apply for asylum in the UK?

If classic raider actions continue against me, my loved ones and my employees, then I will have to seriously consult with lawyers on this issue. But for me, obtaining asylum abroad will be a painful decision. Problems come out of nowhere and go nowhere. Such traditions of Russian business have a centuries-old history. I worked out all the ways and mechanisms of defense with lawyers, and was surprised to learn that in the UK 27 thousand Russians applied for political asylum.

Your brother Akhmed Bilalov is also abroad, although no charges have been brought against him yet, despite checks at the KSK, where he headed the board of directors. Will he also seek asylum?

It is inappropriate for me to comment on anything related to my brother. I can say that his health situation is very difficult: he is forced to devote all his time to this issue for at least a few more months. (Akhmed Bilalov told the media that he was still in mid-2012, but was hospitalized in one of the clinics in Germany two months after the inspection by the president of the Mountain Carousel resort. - Slon).

Let's get back to the charges against you. The investigation believes that you, being a co-owner of the Krasnaya Polyana company - the developer of the Mountain Carousel - through your actions caused damage to another shareholder and creditor of the company - Sberbank. How was the published amount of damage of 45 million rubles calculated?

Where this amount comes from, you need to ask the investigators or those who brought them a ready-made decision on the criminal case. But so that you understand how events developed, let's go back to 2009, when Sberbank decided to build its headquarters at the Gornaya Karusel resort for the 2014 Winter Games. Then the bank allocated a little less than 1 billion rubles for the purchase of its headquarters, which was approximately 70–80% of the total contract amount. This was targeted funding: we could not spend this money on other facilities at the resort. At the same time, Sberbank changed the size of its headquarters several times: initially its area was about 8 thousand square meters. meters, then increased to 20 thousand square meters. meters. While the design was underway, we could not start construction. Then it was decided to put these funds on deposit at 7–8% per annum in the National Bank for Business Development. This was the market percentage. Within the agreed period, the entire deposit was returned to Sberbank.

But at the same time, the NBB issued loans to Krasnaya Polyana at an interest rate of 12% per annum. This is another point on which the investigation accuses you.

Loans were issued from the bank's capital long before Sberbank placed a deposit, starting back in 2005. For example, for the purchase of ski lifts for the second stage of the resort. The cost of each such lift is about €15 million. Also, the NBB “Krasnaya Polyana” issued loans to pay taxes and for the development of the company. The NBB, lending to the Olympic site, took a great risk, and the bank's shareholders never received dividends. In this regard, the statements that I, as a co-owner of the NBB, earned 45 million rubles from Sberbank deposits and loans to Krasnaya Polyana are an outright lie. The absurdity of the accusations made for the entire banking market is obvious. For example, the difference between deposits and loans from the same Sberbank is the same few percent, and to say, for example, that German Gref thus profiting from depositors means calling into question the essence of the banking business.

All these transactions are related-party transactions: they must be approved by the board of directors or the general meeting of shareholders.

In terms of the size of the transactions we are talking about now, they are within the competence of the board of directors (from 25% to 50% of the value of the company’s net assets). All transactions were agreed upon; Krasnaya Polyana’s documents on receiving loans from the NBB contain the signature of the chairman of the company’s board of directors, Stanislav Kuznetsov, who is also vice president of Sberbank. If any of the shareholders, including the state bank, did not agree with this decision, by law they have the right to protest the transactions within a year, but this was not done. The matter of deposits and loans is within the competence of arbitration courts, but not of law enforcement agencies. But no one has ever applied to arbitration courts.

Investigative measures against you followed criticism from Vladimir Putin, who in February 2013, during an inspection of Olympic construction sites, was extremely dissatisfied with the timing of the construction of ski jumps...

I have a certificate of honor signed by the president of the country: I was given it after the jumps in the Mountain Carousel received the FIS - International Ski Federation certificate, and several stages of the Ski Jumping World Cup took place here right on time. We have received the highest marks for the quality of our work. All this happened in 2012. There was no official acceptance certificate for the facility, other than a temporary one, because the Olimpstroy state corporation did not fulfill its obligations. Meanwhile, a temporary permit to put the facility into operation was agreed upon with the Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak. He knew very well that it was not my brother who was involved in the project, but me, as a co-owner of Krasnaya Polyana. Therefore, the subsequent statements by the Deputy Prime Minister regarding “Comrade Bilalov”, when he meant Akhmed, are more than incorrect. My brother never had a share in this project and was not a member of the management bodies. But, apparently, the speakers on the springboard could not justify the acquisition of this non-core asset by Sberbank - now worth billions of dollars to it - in any other way. Moreover, back in May, Vladimir Putin asked Dmitry Kozak at a meeting in Sochi why Sberbank is now the main bank for ski jumps in the country.

- There were also rumors that the springboard was not designed correctly. Were there any mistakes with choosing a location?

The landing site for the ski jumps was chosen by the IOC. As for the talk that something was designed incorrectly or the location is bad, I think this is akin to those fairy tales that the project was not completed on time or was built at an expensive price. The best and most respected experts worked on the project. There were German companies, Norwegians, we were very tightly controlled by Nordby Torgier (FIS expert) and the best Russian experts - Fedorovsky, Kurilo and Kabantsev. They are the most respected design experts. The project passed three state inspections, which also did not reveal any problems. Therefore, I think that before publicly arguing that the ski jump project was “designed as if for the enemy,” you must at least have at least a minimal understanding of construction yourself.

- What led to the rise in price of ski jumps, about which the president also criticized the investor?

The initial cost of this object was 1.8 billion rubles. Then this amount increased to 4 billion rubles. The increase in price was due to increased demands from the FIS and the Organizing Committee of Sochi 2014. All money for construction is from shareholders, some of which was raised in the form of loans. The amount of 8 billion rubles, which is now called the final amount of the springboard, is false, and the president was deliberately lied to. The sports facility itself still costs 4 billion rubles. The same amount is the budget for the creation of protective structures for the ski jumps and the roads to them. The state corporation Olimpstroy was initially responsible for these objects, which was confirmed by documents signed, by the way, by Vladimir Putin. But the state corporation failed, and in order to save the project, Dmitry Kozak decided that it was necessary to forget about government obligations and blame everything on the investor. For me, these funds were unaffordable: I spoke about this to Dmitry Kozak and his people, the same questions were repeatedly raised at meetings with both the president and the prime minister.

But in May 2012, Stanislav Kuznetsov, it turns out, agreed at a meeting with Dmitry Kozak, who has been manually supervising Olympstroy for many years, to build the adjacent infrastructure at the expense of Krasnaya Polyana OJSC, which came as a complete surprise to me. Moreover, this is a major deal, and it never went through corporate approvals, that is, on Kuznetsov’s part it was actually falsified. This was followed by a protocol order from Mr. Kozak to build infrastructure at the expense of Krasnaya Polyana itself. Then Sberbank gained control over the company, becoming the owner of 50% of the shares, that is, it was the main bank of the country that had to pay government obligations. For the project, this meant the end of business.

- Did you have a personal conflict with Dmitry Kozak?

We didn’t have any conflicts with Dmitry Nikolaevich; he sometimes made harsh comments to us. I agreed with some things, and on some issues he agreed with me.

At the beginning of our conversation, you said that a well-planned attack was taking place against you and your loved ones. In whose interests?

I told you several times the name of Sberbank Vice President Stanislav Kuznetsov, who personally oversees the project in Krasnaya Polyana. My brother Akhmed and I have known Stanislav for at least seven years, when he was still head of the department of administrative affairs of the Ministry of Economic Development. I am sure that he, being a retired colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - he is also a member of the Public Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - initiated a criminal case against me. He understands perfectly well that his vigorous activity may raise questions not only from Sberbank President German Gref, but also from depositors and shareholders of the bank.

- What are these questions?

For example, why did Stanislav enter into a general contract with the Turkish construction company Sembol? This is precisely where our open conflict with him began. Sembol builds for about $3 thousand per sq. m. meter. I resisted this, explaining to him that our own contractors built for $1.5–1.8 thousand per sq. m. meter. After the state bank gained control of the project, the construction economy plummeted. Over the course of the year, the project estimate, including commercial real estate at the resort, increased from 40 billion to 82 billion rubles. The result is forever unpaid real estate, which today is being built at the expense of depositors of the country's main bank. I do not rule out the possibility of filing lawsuits in international courts against Sberbank structures regarding damage to shareholders by the management of Krasnaya Polyana. For example, at that time large transactions were concluded without corporate approvals on the direct orders of Kuznetsov. There is enough fundamental evidence for this. I also plan in the near future to send statements to Russian law enforcement agencies about the deliberate infliction of millions of losses on me as a shareholder by the company’s management.

- Suppose there was a reason to squeeze you out of the project. Why then did Ahmed get all the public criticism?

Akhmed is a notable figure: before the KSK, he was in the Federation Council, and even earlier in the legislative assembly of the Krasnodar Territory, and actively worked in the United Russia party. And the general public didn’t really know me until that time. As I understand it, the culprit should have been a person with a well-known name. When the attack on Krasnaya Polyana began and, as a result, Akhmed lost all his posts, the media voiced the reason for what happened. For example, newspapers wrote that Akhmed’s problems began after KSK began to propose to the Russian government to create a special economic zone after the Olympics in Sochi and Krasnaya Polyana, where all facilities built with budget funds could be transferred. According to the media, it was proposed to appoint KSK to manage the zone. Your colleagues concluded that some of the officials, who could have lost control over the situation in Sochi after the Games, framed Akhmed. But I want to believe that this is nothing more than a conspiracy theory. Although now this particular economic zone is being created in Krasnaya Polyana to save the business of Olympic investors.

- You sold your remaining third of Krasnaya Polyana Mikhail Gutseriev, in his own words, for $20 million. Did they point out to you the figure of the co-owner of Russneft?

Our family has known the Gutseriev family for a long time. When we had difficulties, he offered to help. At one time he too faced similar problems. Why Mikhail Safarbekovich needed my Krasnaya Polyana package, I don’t know, but I’m sure he was right. Now about the price for the shares that he paid me. At first, he publicly spoke about $20 million, then, a month later, about $400 million, but in reality the order of the numbers is different. I promised Gutseriev not to disclose the amount.

In May, you also sold your 34.26% of the National Bank for Business Development to the owner of Semenovskaya Manufactory Pavel Kachalov and the founder of Round Lake Denis Baryshev. According to analysts, you could earn no more than 450 million rubles for your package. Is it so?

I don't name the price. The conditions under which I sold my shares in Krasnaya Polyana and the National Bank for Business Development cannot be called market conditions. I received some money - that's already good. [...]

["Kommersant", 04/27/2007, "The police know the purchase of Sochi": The government yesterday published a decree appointing Stanislav Kuznetsov, head of the department for managing the affairs of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, as deputy minister of economic development and trade. Mr. Kuznetsov, a colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, will manage the federal target program for the development of Sochi for 2006-2014 and control all the “Olympic” programs of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade with a total value of 314 billion rubles. [...]
Stanislav Kuznetsov was born on July 25, 1962 in Leipzig, East Germany. In 1984 he graduated from the Military Red Banner Institute of the Ministry of Defense, in 2002 - from the Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Candidate of Legal Sciences, speaks German and Czech. In 1998-2002 he worked in various positions in the International Cooperation Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, holding the rank of colonel. From the position of first deputy head of the department he moved to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, in 2002-2004 he served as head of the administrative department of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, and from 2004 to 2007 he headed the department of administrative affairs of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. [...]
Quite a bit is known about Mr. Kuznetsov himself, despite the fact that Stanislav Kuznetsov accompanies German Gref during most of his visits to the regions and has been present at most open meetings at the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade since 2005, however, in rather small positions. As a source close to Mr. Kuznetsov told Kommersant, he had long been applying for the position of German Gref’s deputy and was even “upset” when Kirill Androsov became deputy head of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.
Kommersant's interlocutor described Stanislav Kuznetsov as a “strong business executive” and expressed confidence that not a single penny in Sochi would be used for other purposes. Let us note that Kommersant sources report that Mr. Kuznetsov was friendly with the ex-head of RosSEZ Yuri Zhdanov. Despite the fact that he came to the department with the same mission, this did not help him retain his post even with the rank of lieutenant general of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - conflicts over control over state investments have recently become commonplace. - Insert K.ru]

["Kommersant - Guide Sochi", 09/15/2010, "The Olympics have already begun for us!" :
Guide: You, following German Gref, moved to Sberbank after the IOC decided to hold the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, where you now oversee preparations for the Games. Tell me, was your move to Sberbank connected with the Olympics?
Stanislav Kuznetsov: No, my transition was not directly related to preparations for the Olympics. One stage just ended and another began. Looking back, I’ll be honest: the team led by German Gref at the Ministry of Economic Development was unique and did a tremendous job in just over seven years. Another thing is that Sberbank, as the largest bank in the country and one of the largest in Eastern Europe, of course, could not stay away from such a colossal and important project as Sochi Olympic Games. This is truly a national project around which the whole country is united, and, in my opinion, not a single large company can remain aloof from such a project. This is exactly the case when you need to help, participate, build, and take certain risks. As bankers, we love to count money, but now that the whole project is structured, I can say that, from our point of view, it is simply doomed to success. - Insert K.ru]

Over the past period of this year and last? Has the nature of these attacks changed and how does the bank respond to them?

- The number of cyber attacks continues to increase - both on Russian banks in general, and on Sberbank as the most “tidbit” of the market, because we have the most clients and data of interest to attackers. This is confirmed by statistics: in the first quarter of 2019, the Sberbank Cyber ​​Defense Center processed more than 12.5 thousand suspected cybersecurity incidents, almost a quarter of them posed a threat to us. This is 1.8 times higher than in the same period last year.

As for the nature of the attacks, I would call 2019 the year of leaks, which are increasingly occurring both in Russia and in the world as a whole. In the first quarter of 2019, 19% more data leaks were recorded worldwide compared to the same period last year. In total, 6.5 billion user data records were compromised worldwide, which is four times more than in the first quarter of 2018.

The number of DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks remains consistently high, when the system is deliberately overloaded with a huge number of requests from different addresses.

Since the beginning of 2019, the Cyber ​​Defense Center’s systems have repelled 52 DDos attacks—significantly more than in the same period last year. Moreover, this year the attacks have become more powerful and longer lasting.

At the same time, cyber attacks are becoming more diverse and increasingly aimed at new technologies. Additional risks are created by various cloud services, as well as the popular BYOD (bring your own device) trend today, when company employees are allowed to work from a personal computer or laptop connected to the company’s internal network.

Separately, I would like to say about the Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G. On the one hand, it’s great when your refrigerator orders food itself, and you can remotely ask the kettle to heat up the water. But you need to understand that in this case, a refrigerator, a kettle, and any other device with Internet access can be used for DDoS attacks. Moreover, you, as a user, will not even know about it, and you are unlikely to think much about the cybersecurity of such devices, because your money is not stored in them. There are already 8 billion IoT devices in the world, their number will grow every year, and, accordingly, the power of DDoS attacks will also only increase.

And I’ll name two more trends. First, criminal groups are increasingly using complex attack scenarios tailored to a specific industry or even company. Second, cybercriminals are increasingly looking for indirect ways to gain access to an organization’s infrastructure. To do this, they attack the “supply chain”: instead of approaching a well-protected company, they find its vulnerable partners and contractors, infect their networks, and through them, the main target. The number of such attacks in the world in 2018 increased by 78%.

Unfortunately, in order to penetrate a company's infrastructure, it is not always necessary to hack software. It is much easier to “hack” an employee who, without knowing it, will lead the criminal to the necessary data. I’m talking, for example, about phishing, which today accounts for more than 60% of attacks on the banking sector of Russia and a number of European countries. Phishing is mass mailings on behalf of popular brands that, for example, you have won a prize or can take a survey and get money for it. Such emails contain a link to a malicious website that is indistinguishable from the website famous brand. By clicking on the link and entering his data, the user infects his device with a virus.

Every year, the Cyber ​​Defense Center prevents more than half a million attempts to send emails containing malicious attachments or phishing links to bank employees. Since the beginning of 2019, specialists from the Sberbank Cyber ​​Security Service have identified and sent for blocking more than 2,000 phishing resources similar to the Sberbank website.

— The other side of the problem is the theft of data and money from citizens, including Sberbank clients. How do you deal with this?

— Our clients are protected from it by a fraud monitoring system based on artificial intelligence. It detects the vast majority of all fraud attempts. Thanks to this system, from January to May of this year, we prevented the theft of customer funds in the amount of over 13.5 billion rubles.

At the end of the first quarter of 2019, over 80% of the total volume of fraud against our clients was so-called “social engineering”. This again means that it is easier to “hack” a person than a system. There are dozens of fraudulent schemes, which most often come down to obtaining confidential information from a person under a plausible pretext (unblocking a card, compensation for spa treatment, etc.): his bank card details, login and password for logging into, for example, “ Sberbank Online".

We constantly carry out explanatory work, telling clients that under no circumstances should anyone, even a bank employee, be given any card details other than its number. We are saying that the PIN code for an ATM and the password for Sberbank Online cannot be stored on paper.

But still, in stressful situations, people often get lost and, with their own hands, give criminals access to their money.

In most cases, the anti-fraud system is able to stop a cybercriminal - it analyzes all of the client’s transactions and in real time identifies suspicious transactions that do not correspond to the client’s financial habits. For example, when pensioner Marya Ivanovna, who lives in Saratov and has never traveled anywhere, suddenly makes a financial transaction in Vladivostok, the bank makes a follow-up call to her, and it turns out that scammers are trying to withdraw money from her account.

But, unfortunately, the main part of fraud using social engineering consists of so-called “self-transfers”, when the client independently performs and confirms a transaction under the influence of a fraudster (for example, transferring an advance payment for a purchase from advertising sites or from social networks), and then contacts the bank with the claim that he was deceived.

The conclusion is obvious: technical means alone, even the most modern and effective ones, cannot completely protect clients from “social engineers.” Therefore, we need to continue working to improve clients’ cyber literacy and strengthen this area at the state level.

— Do you work proactively - for example, do you see attacks on other companies/users and adjust your infrastructure?

— The essence of cybersecurity lies precisely in the fact that it is a constant, second-by-second work to stay ahead of the curve, a continuous “arms race” that occurs on both sides of the law. And one of the key components of this work is the exchange of information. This is always difficult: who would want to tell, even a narrow circle of experts, that they were hacked, and even describe the process in detail? It’s hard, but if you remain silent, it will only get worse for everyone. As they say, all companies are divided into those who have been hacked and those who do not yet know that they have been hacked. We want the expert community to learn about such hacks as early as possible in order to prevent them in the future.

Of course, we closely monitor everything that happens in the world of cybersecurity, exchange information with Russian and international partners, improve monitoring tools, and develop our security technologies. In particular, we have developed and use our own Threat Intelligence Platform, which allows us to collect and analyze information on various cyber threats.

We are fighting for information cooperation to become a well-functioning mechanism for all participants in the process: business, government. And this cooperation must be international, must be above any geopolitics and any bureaucracy. Otherwise, it will not make any sense, because cybercriminals, unlike you and me, are not tied to national borders: from anywhere in the world they can attack any company and citizen of any country.

The leading criminal cyber groups are transnational, and without international cooperation they cannot be brought to light.

In Russia, we have already managed to formulate the basic outlines of such cooperation in the financial sector. For example, the platform for exchanging data on cyber threats, implemented under the auspices of the Association of Banks of Russia, today unites more than 40 banks, including the largest financial institutions in the country. In just six months of work, thanks to data exchange, it was possible to prevent losses of more than 3 billion rubles.

There are also serious successes on a global scale. The work is carried out by the WEF Center for Cybersecurity (C4C), official opening which took place during the annual session in Davos in 2018. This is a unique platform for cooperation between representatives of the largest global corporations, leading players international market cybersecurity, representatives of law enforcement agencies in order to develop a joint strategy to combat global cybercrime. Sberbank is one of the founding partners of C4C and has permanent place V Supervisory Board center.

— What solutions in the field of information security can you offer to the foreign market?

— Cybersecurity services for external clients are provided by our subsidiary BI.ZONE, one of the world-recognized leaders in the field of cybersecurity. This is the research and analysis of malicious software, investigation of cybersecurity incidents and rapid response to these incidents, collection of information about potential threats, various types of testing: for security against social engineering methods, for penetration, for the security of mobile and web applications.

I would like to emphasize that sometimes our colleagues help for free - this can be compared to putting out a fire, when you need to react quickly, without waiting for formalities, otherwise hundreds and thousands of people will suffer.

We had a case when BI.ZONE employees went to one of the hospitals in which the operation of medical equipment was paralyzed due to hackers, and the health and lives of patients were at risk.

We are actively developing the Russian cyber risk insurance market. Our subsidiary Sberbank Insurance was the first in Russia to offer mass cyber risk insurance products. Thus, in 2017, the company included the risk of production interruption as a result of cyber attacks in its insurance package for small businesses. During the first year of the program, about 3.5 thousand clients took out such policies, and in the first quarter of 2019 - about 3 thousand. At the end of 2018, the company offered this type of insurance to individuals, including the risk of cyber threats in the bank card insurance product. During the six months of operation, about 2 million clients have already taken out such policies.

And I’ll give one more example: our mobile applications Sberbank Online for the Android platform contains a built-in antivirus. It protects not only the application itself and the client’s money, but also the entire smartphone. Reliable and completely free not only for clients - for everyone who installed our application from official store. Considering that Sberbank Online is one of the five applications with the largest active audience in Russia - we have over 40 million active users - we can say that this is our significant contribution to the cybersecurity of a significant part of the country's population.

— What technologies based on artificial intelligence increase resistance to cyber threats?

— The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) radically simplifies many routine tasks facing cybersecurity departments. The amount of data is growing exponentially, and only AI can cope with this, which takes on the most labor-intensive operations, including round-the-clock monitoring and repelling every second cyber-attacks. Today, both are carried out automatically - a person connects only when the situation goes beyond the typical framework.

And at the same time, criminals are also aware of all its artificial intelligence capabilities. And they not only attack the victim’s AI to penetrate the company’s systems, but also use it themselves to find vulnerabilities, conduct phishing attacks, bypass biometric authentication and security, create malicious software, and guess passwords.

— One of the sessions of the International Cybersecurity Congress is called “Secure Digital World - Future or Utopia?” In your opinion, is this the future or a utopia?

— I would say this: the digital world is certainly our future, because progress is irreversible. How safe this world will be depends on all of us. And from the state and business, which must develop legislation adequate to existing cyber threats. And from law enforcement agencies who will monitor its compliance. And from citizens who, I am sure, will gradually learn to respond to cyber threats as sensitively as they do to threats from the physical world.

After all, we, relatively speaking, do not carry our money in an open wallet in the middle of the night in the most criminal area, nor do we leave the house leaving the door wide open. But for some reason we still come up with passwords like 123456.

And here I see two directions, each of which is equally important: on the one hand, the fight against cybercrime, and on the other hand, the development of digital literacy and cyber culture, I would even say cyber hygiene. Yes, we want to make the digital world safe, we are confident that we can, and we are ready to invest money in this. But even now, by following simple security measures, each of us can significantly reduce the likelihood of becoming a victim of a hacker attack or social engineering. This applies to both companies and individuals.

And, I repeat, I see the key to success in cooperation and interaction, in the unity of all those who, just as much as we do, want to make the digital world safe. This is why we are holding the International Cybersecurity Congress for the second year in a row with the participation of business, government, experts, and IT specialists from all over the planet. Therefore, “utopia” is precisely the idea that everything will “settle down” on its own. If nothing is done, the World Economic Forum projects that the global cost of cybercrime, already $1.5 trillion in 2018, will reach $8 trillion by 2022. So let’s work together to break this dangerous trend and look for an antidote to the plague of the 21st century - the cybercrime pandemic.

tell friends