The 1st rank cruiser "Varyag" became the first of the cruisers ordered under the shipbuilding program of 1898. It received its name in honor of one of the corvettes of the Russian fleet's expedition to America.
The cruiser was built in the city (USA) at the William Crump and Sons plant according to the design of the Marine Technical Committee.
Construction of the hull began in October 1898 on an open plant slipway near the Delaware River. The official laying of the cruiser took place on May 10, 1899, and launching on October 19. Because of various kinds discrepancies, as well as strikes, the delivery deadline was missed several times, and factory tests began only in May 1900.
On January 2, 1901, having received telegraphic permission from the Main Naval Headquarters, he raised the pennant, but due to a significant number of deficiencies and accidents due to the fault of the Varyag plant, he was able to leave Philadelphia only in March 1901. Having traveled more than 5,000 miles, on the morning of May 3 1901 cruiser "Varyag" under the command of captain 1st rank V.I. Bera anchored at . In Kronstadt, the Varyag was inspected by the highest ranks of the fleet and two months after completing a series of works, it was sent to join the Pacific squadron.
For various reasons, the cruiser was delayed on the way and arrived in Port Arthur only on February 25, 1902, where it began its combat mission. On March 1, 1903, V.I. Baer transferred command of the cruiser, the highest order for the appointment of which took place on December 16, 1902. V.F. Rudnev was forty-seven years old, of which thirty were given to the Russian navy.
Until the autumn of 1903, the coloring of the cruiser "Varyag" corresponded to peacetime standards: a white hull with a bright green underwater part; superstructures, deckhouses, masts, rostra, davits, bells, boats and cutters, all deck equipment - white; the chimney up to the middle is yellow, and the rest of the pipes and yards are black; waterweiss - light brown. The flooring of the decks and bridges is teak.
In the fall of 1903, the cruiser "Varyag", like the entire Pacific squadron, was repainted in a "combat" color: black and ocher, mixed in a ratio of 1: 3. The ships were painted in this color, always with a matte surface without any shine, from the waterline to the klotik. The only exception was the orange stripe on the chimneys; its height for cruisers was set at 0.9 meters. On December 27, 1903, we received an order by radio from the squadron commander to prepare for a campaign and the next day, by order of the governor, to go to Chemulpo. “Varyag” was appointed as a senior stationary and was placed at the disposal of Envoy Pavlov. Having taken on board two employees of the Russian mission, the Varyag weighed anchor in Port Arthur on December 28 and headed for Chemulpo, where it arrived on December 29, 1903.
On January 27, 1904, on the first day of the Russian-Japanese War, the name “Varyag” thundered throughout the world, becoming synonymous with courage and loyalty to military duty. The cruiser found itself blocked in Chemulpo by the overwhelming forces of the Japanese fleet. But the Russian sailors did not even think about surrender. It is difficult to imagine a situation so inconsistent with the tactical purpose of a light reconnaissance cruiser than the one in which she found herself in this battle. Forced to maneuver at low speed in a narrow and shallow exit channel, being under concentrated fire from six Japanese cruisers, who had a fourfold superiority in large and medium caliber artillery, our ships still managed to cause a fire on the heavy cruiser Asama, damage another cruiser and sink one from destroyers. But the forces were too unequal and they blew up the Koreets and sank the Varyag. , having personally verified that the ship was empty, was the last to leave it. The crews of "Varyag" and "Koreets" returned to Russia through neutral ports. In 1905, "Varyag" was raised by the Japanese and enlisted in the fleet under the name "Soya". In April 1916, it was purchased by Russia from Japan and in November 1916, under the previous name "Varyag", came to Russia, where it was included in the Arctic Ocean flotilla. The February Revolution of 1917 caught the cruiser en route when it was heading to England for repairs. After the Great October Revolution, the Varyag, which was stationed under a red flag in Liverpool, was captured by the British, among other Russian ships. The cruiser was scheduled for scrapping; along the way, in the Irish Sea near the town of Lendalfoot, it jumped onto the rocks and by 1925 was dismantled for metal.
The feat of the "Varyag" entered the chronicle of Russian naval glory, remaining to this day one of the most striking examples of loyalty to the Motherland and military duty. The name and glory of "Varyag" was inherited by the Guards missile cruiser Red Banner Pacific Fleet.

Scale - 1:200
Number of sheets: 12
Format: A3

The Russian Imperial Navy served for almost 200 years. Its power reached a high level during the Russo-Japanese War. By 1905, the fleet had become the third most powerful in the world. The cruiser "Bogatyr" took part in two wars, conquered the seas and lived for almost 22 years.

Project history

"Bogatyr" - an armored cruiser, was designed at the beginning of the 20th century. The reason for its development was the same Japan, which at that time was exciting with its power and strength. Two years before the start of the new century, the Japanese created a program to equip and increase the power of their fleet.

Russia decided not to lag behind, so with the project “For the needs of the Far East” it began to design ships that could gain superiority over the enemy. Initially, it was planned to create two types of armored cruisers with different displacements. But then the program slowed down due to the fact that the plans of 1895 were not fulfilled.

The Maritime Ministry decided to seek help from shipbuilding firms abroad. After holding a small competition, Russia drew attention to the project presented by Germany. The country presented a ship with powerful artillery and a displacement of 6,250 tons.

Implementation of the planned

They began building the cruiser the very next year after drawing up the project plan. At the end of 1899, the lead ship was laid down, with the bright and powerful name “Bogatyr”. Construction of the future sea fighter has begun in full swing. While working on the ship, the Germans decided to transfer 3 more drawings to Russia, thanks to which armored cruisers of the “Bogatyr” type were to appear.

Construction did not go smoothly. Problems constantly arose with the supply of parts and directly with the design. Both sides argued all the time and could not agree on the final project even during its implementation. Because of this, the deadlines were constantly postponed, and the ship was not ready.

At the beginning of 1901, the cruiser "Bogatyr", the drawings of which were successfully turned into a powerful vessel, took to the water. After conducting a lot of tests, including speed tests, the ship was handed over to the customer in 1902, and it was able to go into battle.

Far East

Course on Far East was adopted after the cruiser "Bogatyr" became a full-fledged combat ship and underwent shooting training. Two squadron battleships and two cruisers went to the Pacific Ocean with him.

Only 2 years later the ship was able to enter into real battle. The entire “Bogatyr” squad was dressed in olive color, Russia declared war with Japan. Cruising was begun. This process was stopped by the sinking of the coastal steamer, the capture of the crew and a storm.

The next cruising only launched the attack and already in March a detachment of 4 cruisers and 2 destroyers bombarded Vladivostok. Over time, more help from 15 ships sailed to him. The Vladivostok detachment was supposed to distract attention, which it did very well.

At the end of April, the cruiser "Bogatyr", whose weapons were one of the most powerful in the detachment, joined the cruisers "Gromoboy" and "Russia". Two destroyers were sent with them. It was quiet cruising that produced excellent results.

The first injury the ship received occurred in May. Sea visibility was extremely low, despite moving at a speed of 10 knots. A team of officers tried to reason with the captain, but all persuasion was in vain. As a result, the Bogatyr was damaged by rocks near Cape Bruce. This event was sad for the entire crew. In addition to the fact that the ship received holes and several compartments were flooded, it could not get off the rocks on its own.

The help that arrived that day did not bring results. The weather also did not play into the sailors' hands. A force 10 storm forced the evacuation of the entire “heroic” crew. After the storm, a mechanic and workers arrived on the ship. The damage was severe. Almost half of the compartments were flooded, and the ship turned around on the rocks.

It took a month and a half to remove the ship from the rocks. All this time he was unloaded until he was completely “liberated.” Until the end of the war, the towed Bogatyr remained in the port of Vladivostok. The ship was still destined to meet the Japanese, but in peacetime. "Bogatyr" accompanied the cruiser "Russia" to the port of Racine. There were two opposing admirals on the ship. Here they discussed the terms of the peace treaty, which they later concluded in Portsmouth.

Baltic adventures

In 1906, “Bogatyr” was returned to service. He was included in the Special Detachment, which was supposed to sail with midshipmen and non-commissioned officers. In the same year, the ship took part in restoring order at the Sveaborg fortress. The uprising was suppressed by artillery fire.

Later, the cruiser "Bogatyr" set sail in the Mediterranean Sea. Here he had to visit Naples at the funeral of N.V. Muravyov, and later rescue earthquake victims off the Italian coast. A few years later, the ship's crew was awarded for this help and for saving 2,400 residents of Messina. In 1912, the cruiser was repaired at the Kronstadt plant, and the next year it sailed the Mediterranean Sea.

Serious fight

Just 13 days after the Germans declared war on the Russians, Bogatyr was able to realize its potential and, together with the cruiser Pallada and two destroyers, knock out an important enemy. A combination of circumstances or fate led to the fact that the German light cruiser Magdeburg landed on the rocks not far from the lighthouse. There was no one to help them, and the crew could not cope with the problem on their own. These attempts were noticed by Russian intelligence officers, and they decided to send our combat detachment here.

The captains of the Bogatyr and Pallada knew about each other’s existence, but had no idea that the command had sent the destroyers Lieutenant Burakov and Zealny to help. Despite the fact that the cruisers were supposed to cover their battle brothers, the destroyers arrived at Magdeburg faster, but were unable to detect the enemy.

The mistake of the German captain, who decided to fire at the lighthouse, gave away their location. The destroyers began to fire at the enemy ship, and the Bogatyr and Pallada approached from the other side and began to attack the Magdeburg. Due to the thick fog, the Russian detachment could not see that the German destroyer had already evacuated the cruiser's crew.

The Russian cruisers also took a toll on the allied destroyers, who mistakenly appeared to be enemies, and they, in turn, fired torpedoes at the Bogatyr and Pallada. In the morning, the Russian captains figured out the problem and focused on the Magdeburg and the auxiliary destroyer.

The enemy ship could not withstand the shelling and blew up its ship. This operation became key thanks to the documents found on board the German cruiser, which later helped to decipher enemy radiograms.

At the end of 1914, the cruiser managed to lay a couple of treacherous mines, which blew up a German cruiser. A year later, the ship again served the Russian fleet with mines and a damaged enemy ship. All First world war“Bogatyr” successfully identified enemies, laid mines and sank ships.

Last breath

After the start of the revolution, the cruiser had to retreat, as changes were observed at the front. Afterwards, he participated in the Baltic Fleet. Later, the ship was sent for storage to the port of Kronstadt. For about 4 years, the cruiser “Bogatyr” was disarmed. In the summer of 1922, the ship was sold for scrap, taken to the Germans, and they dismantled it. The cruiser was officially removed from the list Russian fleet only in 1925.

Brethren

The series of brothers "Bogatyr" was very successful. Among them were “Vityaz”, “Oleg”, “Ochakov”, “Kahul”. The last two were renamed two and three times. Each of the cruisers served for a long time, except for the Vityaz. This ship burned down during construction and was not put into operation.

The Bogatyr was the very first to be launched, as is known, in 1901, followed by the Ochakov. True, he entered service not as quickly as his “elder brother”, only in 1909. He served until 1920 and was detained by the French. “Cahul” was renamed twice, first to “Memory of Mercury”, later to “Comintern”. During World War II, it was disarmed and sunk to create a breakwater.

The last cruiser from the Oleg series also did not live long, only until 1919, due to a torpedo attack by a British boat. But in 1938 it was raised from the bottom and cut into metal.

The cruiser "Bogatyr", a photo of which is presented in the article, became very popular due to its exploits. This ship appeared in game World of Warships. He takes place in the Soviet branch at level 3. The project developers tried to recreate it as accurately as possible.

Several times creative people tried to immortalize the cruiser "Bogatyr". Its model was created on a scale of 1/100, while it was made as close as possible to the original. Some exhibits can be disassembled in half, along the waterline, in order to install electric motors inside to control the cruiser on the water.

Continuing the theme of good fleet ships and Russian auxiliary cruisers, for quite some time I have been digging through old publications available on Google Books in order to pull out ship drawings from there. As it turned out, there were quite a lot of drawings of ships that were either built for Dobroflot, or were purchased to become auxiliary cruisers during the heated period international relations. I decided to organize this collection here. I will add drawings as I find them.

For priming

All drawings are highly clickable
1.
Cruiser Russia(1868; ex-German liner Holsatia)
Cruiser Moscow(1866; ex-German liner Hammonia)
Cruiser Petersburg(1870; ex-German liner Thuringia)

All three cruisers began life as similar German Frisia-class liners, and were purchased in 1878 during the Russo-Turkish War.

Drawings for SS Frisia

2.
Cruiser Asia(1874; former US liner Columbus)
Cruiser Africa(1877; former US liner Saratoga)
Cruiser Europe(1878; ex-US liner State of California)

Three American liners purchased in 1878 during the Russo-Turkish War and converted into cruisers.

I haven't found any drawings yet

3.
Auxiliary cruiser Moscow(1898) - mobilized in 1904.

4.
Auxiliary cruiser Kuban(1889; ex-German liner Auguste Victoria, ex-Augusta Victoria, ex-Normannia)

Former German liner purchased from Hamburg America Line in 1904, there are two sets of drawings, on Auguste Victoria and on Normannia

Auguste Victoria

8.
Auxiliary cruiser Dnieper(1894; former Dobroflot liner Petersburg II)

I haven't found any drawings yet.

9.
Auxiliary cruiser Rion(1901; former Dobroflot liner Smolensk)

The Dobroflot steamship mobilized in 1904.

The location of artillery in Smolensk according to the original project.

10.
Auxiliary cruiser Rus(1887; ex-German liner Lahn)

Former German liner purchased from Norddeutscher Lloyd in 1904. I found a small picture on the Norway Heritage website, so it means that the drawings exist in nature, but I haven’t found them on Google Books yet. I will continue to look for them

You can buy them on this site, so if anyone is interested, come here.

11.
Auxiliary cruiser Lena(1899; former Dobroflot liner Kherson)

The Dobroflot steamship mobilized in 1904.

The location of artillery on Kherson according to the original project.

That's all for now, if I missed any ships, write, I'll look for them. As I find drawings, I will update the post.

Drawing of a model of the cruiser "Memory of Azov".
Sailing rigs, superstructures

The ship diagram shows:
1. Schematic side view of a cruiser with a full sail rig - the location, outline and cut of the slanting sails (jib, jib and tresel).
2. Plan of the right half of the deck with the location of the lower stays and davit positions.
3. Schemes for the design of a boat shot and a lifting outboard ladder.
4. Rear view of the bulkhead between the main deck and the forecastle deck, forecastle cargo hatch.
5. Drawing of the skylights of the lower deck and the engine room on the quarterdeck.
6. View of the deck section with the skylight of the officers' quarters, the wheelhouse and the aft bridge with a compass binnacle.
On the sides are davits of ten-oared boats.
7. Diagrams of the davits of whaleboats, rowing and steam boats, respectively
8. general form front superstructure with upper and lower navigation bridges, conning tower on the lower bridge, front - ventilation sockets.
On the sponson (the protruding side platform of the hull) there is a 203-mm gun in a protective armored casing.
9. Drawing of straight sails of the fore and main masts with installed lower and topsails.

General information about the ship and model:

In this article we will try to understand the degree of participation of Italian specialists in the creation of Project 26 and 26-bis cruisers, as well as the position of Soviet cruisers in the international classification of the 30s of the last century.

To begin with, let’s refresh our memory of the “main milestones” in the design of cruisers of the Kirov and Maxim Gorky type.

July-August 1932- a Soviet commission was sent to Italy and worked, whose task was to familiarize itself with the Italian shipbuilding industry, select a prototype for the Soviet cruiser and purchase a boiler-turbine power plant with a capacity of 100-120 thousand hp. The choice was made in favor of the cruiser Montecuccoli, and the commission proposed purchasing the theoretical drawing and power plant of the latter.

March 19, 1933 an adjusted version of the OTZ “with the mechanisms (turbines) of the Italian cruiser Montecuccoli” was approved. In accordance with the new OTD, the leadership of the Directorate of Naval Forces of the Red Army entrusts the Research Institute of Military Shipbuilding (NIVK) with the development of a preliminary design of the ship.

May 8, 1933 The management of the Red Army UMS entered into an agreement with the Central Design Bureau of Shipbuilding (in other sources - “special shipbuilding”) TsKBS-1 to create a general (technical) project for the cruiser.

July 11, 1933 The Council of Labor and Defense approves the “Naval Shipbuilding Program for 1933-1938,” which provided for the construction of eight light cruisers for the Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets.

May 14, 1934 an agreement was signed between the Italian company Ansaldo and TsKBS-1 under which (among other things) the Italians undertook to supply the power plant for the cruiser Eugenio di Savoia and full set documentation for setting up the production of such installations in the USSR. From this moment on, Italian specialists are directly involved in the design of the Project 26 cruiser.

By September 1934 NIVK manages to develop a new preliminary design, according to which it is impossible to “pack” the performance characteristics of the Project 26 cruiser into a standard displacement of 6,500 tons, and that the cruiser will be obtained by increasing the standard displacement to 6,970 tons. This preliminary design of NIVK was transferred to TsKBS-1 for the development of a technical design

In October 1934 head of development of main caliber turrets A.A. Florensky proposed placing not two, but three guns in the turret of the Project 26 cruiser.

In November 1934 TsKBS-1 presented technical project. However, the results of TsKBS-1 turned out to be even more discouraging - according to the calculations presented, the standard displacement of the cruiser should have reached 7,225 tons, and the speed dropped by half a knot. At the same time, insufficient armor and armament of the ship were noted.

November 5th, 1934 V. M. Orlov approves the replacement of two-gun turrets with three-gun ones. At the same time, he sets the standard displacement of the Project 26 cruiser at 7120-7170 tons.

At the end of 1934(Unfortunately, there is no exact date. - Author's note) "Ansaldo" hands over to the Soviet side a theoretical drawing of the cruiser, which was tested in the Rome and Hamburg experimental pools.

December 20, 1936 According to project 26, a cruiser for the Baltic (the future “Maxim Gorky”) is being laid.

January 14, 1937 According to project 26, a cruiser for the Black Sea (the future Molotov) is being laid.

In January 1937 The Kirov under construction is visited by the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet L.M. Haller proposes to remake the conning and wheelhouse, as well as a number of other posts. In the future, ideas arise about improving armor protection, etc.

In April 1937 a final decision is made: the first two ships of the series (Kirov and Voroshilov) will be completed according to Project 26, and the two recently laid down ships will be completed according to Project 26-bis - with enhanced armor and armament, an increased total fuel supply and a modified bow superstructure.

June-August 1938- laying down of the last 26-bis type cruisers (“Kalinin” and “Kaganovich”) for the Pacific Fleet.

What did the Soviet cruisers end up becoming? Were they a copy of the Italian ones, adjusted for a 180 mm main caliber? Let's look at the main tactical and technical characteristics of cruisers.

Of course, there is some “relatedness” between the projects, but the differences between them are very large, and the matter is in no way limited to main-caliber guns alone. For example, the armor of Soviet and Italian cruisers has fundamental differences. The Italians relied on vertical protection and installed spaced armor on their ships (in addition to waist armor, there was also an armored partition to “catch” fragments from shells that pierced the main armor belt), but their horizontal protection was not good. Soviet cruisers, on the contrary, receive a very powerful armored deck, which at the time of design is superior to that of almost all light cruisers in the world, but they refuse spaced side armor, limiting themselves to an armored belt of moderate thickness. It is interesting that the Italians, while providing very good side armor, for some reason ignored the traverses, which they received much weaker protection: for example, the Eugenio di Savoia has a side covered with a 70-mm belt and behind it a 30-35-mm bulkhead , while the traverse is only 50 mm thick. A rather strange decision, taking into account the fact that light cruisers are characterized by both a counter battle on converging courses and a retreat battle, when armoring the extremities is of the greatest importance. Soviet cruisers are more logical in this regard - the thickness of their side and beam armor is the same.

There are other differences: Soviet cruisers have a smaller displacement, but their total fuel supply is greater (if we compare the Kirov and the Montecuccoli and the Eugenio di Savoia with the Maxim Gorky). The design of the hulls differs, and even the geometric dimensions of the ships do not match. And it would be nice if the dimensions of Soviet cruisers were proportionally smaller than Italian ones, which would be fully explained by the smaller displacement of domestic ships. But no: Soviet cruisers are longer and wider than Italian ones, but the Montecuccoli and Eugenio di Savoia have more draft. Someone may say that a few meters of length and several tens of centimeters of draft do not play a role, but this is not so - such changes significantly change the theoretical design of the ship.

We will look at the differences between Italian and Soviet cruisers in more detail in the description of the design of cruisers of projects 26 and 26 bis, but for now we will only note that neither the Kirov nor the Maxim Gorky are a copy of foreign ships. Let us add that visually the Italian and Soviet cruisers also had significant differences:

Graphics by S. Balakin and Elio Ando brought to a single scale

But if the Kirov is not a “180 mm copy” of the Montecuccoli or Eugenio di Savoia, then what is the role of the Italians in the creation of the Soviet cruiser? Here, unfortunately, there remain a lot of questions that await their thoughtful researcher. The design of Project 26 cruisers has been described many times, but very briefly, while various sources largely contradict each other. This would seem to be a fairly simple question: it is well known (and confirmed by all sources) that the power plant (PP) for our cruisers was purchased in Italy. But from which cruiser? After all, the EU “Montecuccoli” and “Eugenio di Savoia” differed from each other. A. Chernyshev and K. Kulagin in their book “Soviet cruisers of the Great Patriotic War” claim that the USSR bought the installation of the cruiser “Eugenio di Savoia”. But if we open the “Encyclopedia of World War II Cruisers. Hunters and Defenders" and look at the section of Soviet cruisers (author - S.V. Patyanin), we are surprised to discover that the power unit of the cruiser "Montecuccoli" was purchased. And, for example, A.V. In his works, Platonov completely avoids this issue in silence, limiting himself to the phrase “the main power plant was purchased in Italy” without further specification.

The answers could be provided by the original documents, but unfortunately, they are not so easy to find: the author of this article could not find the text of the agreement with Ansaldo dated May 11, 1934. However, we have at our disposal a “Certificate from the Shipbuilding Department of the Red Army Naval Forces on cooperation with the Italian company "Ansaldo" in the field of shipbuilding" dated May 11, 1934 (i.e., drawn up three days before the signing of the agreement - author's note) signed by the Head of the Shipbuilding Department of the UVMS of the Red Army Sivkov (hereinafter referred to as the "Certificate"). It says:

"I. As a result of receiving mechanisms and technical assistance for shipbuilding from the Italian company Ansaldo, a cruiser should be built with the following main elements: armament: 6 - 180 mm guns in 3 paired turrets; 6 - 100 mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 45 mm semi-automatic; 6 - 5 inch machine guns (an obvious typo, they probably meant 0.5 inch, i.e. 12.7 mm machine guns - author's note); 2 - 3 21 inch torpedo tubes; 2 - aircraft on a catapult; PUAO system of the Italian “Central”; Barrage mines and depth charges are in overload. Reservation: side - 50 mm; deck - 50 mm. Speed ​​- 37 knots. The power of the main mechanisms is 126,500 hp. With. (meaning power during boost - author's note) Navigation area - 12 hours. full swing(450 miles). Econ. progress from normal zap. - 1400 miles. Displacement - standard, 7 thousand tons.
II. In furtherance of the agreement, the company will supply:
a) A complete set of main and auxiliary mechanisms - boilers, turbo and diesel dynamos, mine compressors, air refrigeration machines, steering gear and other small mechanisms of the machine-boiler installation, completely identical to those of the Italian cruiser "E. di Savoia", with all working drawings, calculations and specifications for the electromechanical part. The mechanisms of this ship are the most modern in the Italian fleet and are currently being manufactured by the company for the 36.5 knot cruiser with a displacement of 6950 tons, which is currently under construction.
b) Technical assistance in setting up the production of the above mechanisms at factories in the USSR, both in terms of metallurgy and in terms of machining and installation. Technological assistance will consist of transferring all technical process data to USSR factories, supplying calibers, templates, fixtures and devices necessary for the manufacture of these mechanisms, sending highly qualified engineers (18 24) and technicians to the USSR to train and supervise the work of our factories and, finally, training our engineers (12) and workers (10) at their factories.
c) A set of drawings, calculations and specifications for the hull of the cruiser Montecuccoli, one of the newest cruisers of the Italian fleet, which entered service in 1935, as well as theoretical drawings and propeller drawings for the cruiser and destroyer we designed.”

Thus, it can be argued that the USSR acquired a complete set of power plant with all auxiliary mechanisms from Eugenio di Savoia (which is confirmed by the similar power of the power plant on this Italian and Soviet cruisers), while the Italians undertook to organize the production of similar plants in the Soviet Union . But then everything is again not clear: the document clearly states the acquisition of “drawings, calculations and specifications” of the Montecuccoli hull, why then do many authors (A. Chernyshev, K. Kulagin and others) indicate that the theoretical drawing of the cruiser “Kirov” was a revised version of "Eugenio di Savoia"? How can this be explained?

It is possible that at the last moment, or even after the conclusion of the contract, a decision was made to replace the Montecuccoli drawings with the Eugenio di Savoia drawings. But some phrases in the above “Help” hint that the sale of the theoretical drawing of the Italian cruiser is only part of the deal, and in addition, the Italians have committed to creating a new theoretical drawing for a specific project of the Soviet ship. Let us pay attention to: “...as well as theoretical drawings and drawings of propellers for the cruiser we designed...” In addition, the fourth section of the “Help” reads:

“The company guarantees the power and fuel consumption of the main mechanisms supplied by it, as well as mechanisms built in the USSR according to its drawings and instructions. In addition, the company guarantees the speed of a ship built according to a theoretical drawing developed by it and equipped with the company’s mechanisms. The material expression of the guarantee is determined by fines that cannot exceed 13% of the value of the contract (according to the Italian-Soviet agreement of May 6, 1933).”

Apparently, the theoretical drawing of Project 26 cruisers was still made on the basis of Eugenio di Savoia, but it is not clear who made it, Soviet or Italian designers.

According to the agreement with the Ansaldo company, the Italians sold us only the power plant and hull drawings, but it is well known that this was not the end of Soviet-Italian cooperation in the creation of Project 26 cruisers: Italian specialists helped us with the calculation of the weight characteristics of the cruiser, in addition, the turret the main caliber were also designed with Italian help. It cannot be ruled out that we contacted Mussolini’s shipbuilding companies on other technical issues. It can be assumed, that Short story design of Soviet cruisers looked like this: after the appearance of the first OTZ (6,000 tons, 4 * 180 mm guns), the USSR had the opportunity to familiarize itself with the projects of the latest Italian cruisers, during which decisions were made to purchase the Montecuccoli power plant and install it on a Soviet ship third main caliber turret. Accordingly, domestic designers created a preliminary design of a cruiser with a displacement of 6,500 tons and carrying 6 * 180 mm guns, and in parallel with this, negotiations were held on the purchase of propulsion and technical assistance from the Italians. In May 1934, an agreement was signed with the Ansaldo company, and the Soviet side declared its desire to build a 7,000-ton cruiser (here, apparently, they were insuring themselves in case of a further increase in displacement). The Italians considered that the theoretical drawing of Eugenio di Savoia would be best suited as a basis for designing a new Soviet ship, and they created a corresponding drawing for a 7,000-ton cruiser with three twin-gun 180-mm turrets, and by the end of 1934 they they “tested” it in European experimental pools. While the Italians were busy with theoretical drawings, Soviet designers were creating a project (still, the internal structure of the compartments of Soviet cruisers, not counting the boiler rooms and engine rooms, is very different from the Italian ones, if only due to different armor systems). Of course, during the design, our design bureaus had the opportunity to consult with the Italians, but to what extent is unclear. As a result, by the end of 1934, Italian theoretical drawings and Soviet studies were supposed to “merge” into a high-quality design for a 7,000-ton cruiser. An accident got in the way - just at the end of 1934, the “spontaneous” proposal of A.A. was accepted in the USSR. Florensky about replacing two-gun turrets with three-gun ones, which required redesigning the turrets, revising the hull design and, of course, reworking the theoretical drawing created by the Italians, but the Soviet design bureaus carried out this work almost independently. Why didn't they ask the Italians? Most likely because they had already fulfilled their obligations and designed the cruiser according to the customer’s wishes, and if the customer suddenly and at the very final stage decided to reconsider the conditions, then the Italians could not be held responsible for this. At the same time, the level of Soviet design thought already made it possible to solve such issues independently.

It should be noted that by making such a decision, the TsKBS-1 specialists took a fair amount of risk - the Italians vouched for achieving the contract speed only if the cruiser was built with an Italian chassis and according to an Italian theoretical drawing. Accordingly, by making changes to the latter, TsKBS-1 specialists took responsibility; now, if the contract speed was not achieved, it was they, and not the Italians, who became responsible. But for such failure one could become an “enemy of the people.”

And yet, the Kirov-class cruisers should be considered primarily a Soviet development. Of course, the USSR took full advantage of the knowledge and shipbuilding experience of Italy, and this was absolutely correct. In the conditions of revolution, civil war and the extremely difficult economic situation of the country in the late 20s and early 30s, the domestic shipbuilding industry could not develop; in fact, it stagnated. And the leading naval powers at that time went into a technological leap: boilers and turbines of the 30s were fundamentally superior to everything that was created before the First World War, very advanced turret installations of medium-caliber artillery appeared, more durable armor, etc. It would be extremely difficult to keep up with all this at the same time (although it is possible, if, for example, we remember the power of the Leningrad leaders’ power plant created in the USSR), so the use of someone else’s experience was more than justified. At the same time, the USSR created a very specific type of cruiser that corresponded to Soviet naval doctrine and was completely different from the cruisers of other powers. One can argue for a long time about how correct the premises laid down in the technical specifications of the first Soviet cruiser were, but one cannot deny the specific characteristics of the ships of Project 26 and 26-bis, which caused so much controversy about their “class” affiliation.

The cruiser "Kirov" during the Second World War, the exact date of the photo is unknown

So what kind of cruisers did the USSR produce? Light or heavy? Let's try to understand the classifications that existed in the 1930s, defined by international maritime treaties.

In 1922, the five largest naval powers in the world (England, USA, Japan, France, Italy) signed the Washington Naval Agreement, according to which the standard displacement of cruisers was limited to 10,000 “long” (or 10,160 metric) tons, and the caliber of guns should not exceed 203 mm:

Article 11 of the Agreement stated: “The contracting parties may not acquire or build, themselves or within their jurisdiction, warships of classes other than large ships and aircraft carriers with a standard displacement exceeding 10,000 tons."

Article 12 stated: “Ships of the Contracting Parties hereafter laid down, other than capital ships, shall not carry guns of a caliber exceeding 8 inches (203 mm).”

There were no other restrictions or definitions for cruisers in this document. In essence, the Washington Agreement tried to limit the construction of battleships and aircraft carriers, and both of the above articles are aimed at preventing participating countries from trying to build battleships under the guise of cruisers. But the Washington Agreement did not regulate the classes of cruisers in any way - do you want to consider a 203-mm ten-thousander a small or light cruiser? Your inalienable right. The agreement simply stated that a ship over 10 thousand tons or with artillery more than 203 mm would be considered a battleship, that’s all. It is interesting that the first Italian “Washington” cruisers “Trento” and “Trieste”, when laid down in 1925, were listed as light cruisers (although they were later reclassified as heavy cruisers). So, from the point of view of the Washington Agreement, the Kirov-class can be safely classified as light cruisers.

The London Naval Treaty of 1930 is a different matter. Article 15 of Section 3 established two subclasses of cruisers, with the affiliation determined by the caliber of the guns: the first subclass included ships with artillery over 155 mm, and the second, respectively, with guns 155 mm or lower. Taking into account the fact that the London Treaty did not cancel the Washington Agreement (according to Article 23, it became invalid on December 31, 1936), both subclasses of cruisers could not be larger than 10 thousand tons of standard displacement.

Interestingly, France and Italy refused to sign Section 3 of the London Treaty, which specifically specified the cruisers. Of course, the point was not at all in the classification, but in the fact that France and Italy sought to avoid restrictions on the tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, which were established by Article 16 of the third section. As it were, full text The treaty was signed by only three maritime powers - the USA, Great Britain and Japan. However, subsequently (Pact of Rome 1931) France and Italy nevertheless agreed to recognize the third section of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, but in 1934 Japan completely refused to implement it.

Despite these "throwing", it can probably still be considered that the London Naval Treaty of 1930 gave world classification cruisers, but it should be borne in mind that the 3rd section of this agreement (along with many others), as well as the Washington Agreement, were valid only until December 31, 1936. So, starting from January 1, 1937, no document regulated the characteristics of cruisers, unless the countries gathered again for an international conference and came up with something, but no one could foresee whether they would gather and what they would decide.

As is known, the USSR did not sign either the Washington Agreement or the London Treaty of 1930 and was not obliged to fulfill their terms, and the commissioning of Soviet Project 26 cruisers should have been carried out (and in fact was carried out) only after these treaties lost force.

The last pre-war maritime agreement regulating classes of surface ships (the London Naval Treaty of 1936) cannot be considered international, since only three of the five largest maritime powers signed it: the USA, England and France. But, although the USSR did not participate in the conference, it recognized its provisions, albeit later. This happened at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet naval agreement of 1937, in which Soviet Union pledged to adhere to the classifications of the London Naval Treaty of 1936. What were these classifications?

The very concept of “cruiser” did not exist in it. There were 2 classes of large artillery warships - large surface ships (Capital ships are surface vessels of war) and light surface ships (Light surface vessels). The first are battleships, which in turn were divided into 2 categories:

1) a ship was considered a 1st category battleship if it had a standard displacement of more than 10 thousand “long” tons, regardless of what caliber of artillery was installed on it. Also included in the 1st category were ships with a displacement of 8 to 10 thousand “long” tons, if the caliber of their artillery exceeded 203 mm;
2) category 2 battleships included ships that had a standard displacement of less than 8 thousand “long” tons, but had more than 203 mm artillery.

What kind of battleship is less than 8 thousand tons? Probably, in this way they tried to separate coastal defense battleships into a separate subclass.

Light surface ships had a standard displacement of no more than 10 thousand “long” tons and were divided into 3 categories:

1) ships whose guns were larger than 155 mm;
2) ships whose guns were equal to or less than 155 mm, and whose standard displacement exceeded 3 thousand “long” tons;
3) ships whose guns were equal to or less than 155 mm and whose standard displacement did not exceed 3 thousand “long” tons.

A number of sources indicate that the second London gave a different definition of light cruisers and that those whose artillery caliber did not exceed 155 mm and standard displacement - 8 thousand “long” tons were considered as such. But judging by the text of the agreement, this is a mistake. The fact is that the London Treaty of 1936 prohibited the construction of “Light surface ships” of the first category (i.e. with guns over 155 mm) and allowed the construction of the 2nd category, but only on the condition that the standard displacement of such ships would not be exceed 8 thousand “long” tons. Those. if any power had cruisers with a displacement of 8 to 10 thousand tons with 155 mm artillery at the time of signing the treaty, it was recognized as light (second category), but until the expiration of the treaty it was forbidden to build light cruisers over 8 thousand tons of displacement.

What about our Kirovs? Obviously, from the point of view of the letter of the treaty, the cruisers of projects 26 and 26 bis are heavy cruisers (the first category of “Light surface ships”). Nevertheless, the small standard displacement (for Project 26 cruisers - 7880 metric tons) was within the limits permitted for construction. Therefore, in the process of agreeing on the Anglo-Soviet naval agreement, the USSR notified England that the new Soviet cruisers were light and had a displacement of less than 8 thousand “long” tons, but they carried 180-mm guns.

In essence, the “moment of truth” had arrived for our cruisers: they were truly different from everything that the leading naval powers had built, and their position in the cruising “table of ranks” remained unclear. Now it was necessary to decide whether they were light or heavy (more precisely, whether they belonged to the first or second category of “light warships” of the London Treaty of 1936), and the question was extremely important. The fact is that if Project 26 cruisers were recognized as heavy, their construction, in accordance with the London Treaty of 1936, should have been prohibited. It is clear that the USSR would not have dismantled the four cruisers under construction, but it was possible to prohibit the laying of such ships in the future or demand the replacement of 180 mm guns with 152 mm ones. References to the fact that the USSR did not have 152-mm artillery at that time cannot be taken into account, since England could well have provided at least drawings, even ready-made guns and turret installations at the most reasonable price.

In order to fully understand what happened next, you need to consider the following. At that time, the British economy was far from booming, and the new naval arms race was ruinous for it. That is why the British were so eager to conclude international treaties limiting the quantity and quality of warships of all classes. This was the only way England could remain a leading naval power (by agreeing to parity only with the USA).

However, England’s efforts were in vain: Italy and Japan did not want to sign new agreement, and thus the British, French and Americans found themselves in a position where the restrictions they had invented applied only to them, but not to their potential opponents. This put England, the USA and France at a disadvantage, but they still went for it, and there was still hope that Japan and Italy would change their minds and join the second London Treaty.

At the same time, the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1937 was concluded only between England and the USSR. And if it turned out that this agreement would in some way contradict the London Naval Treaty of 1936, then both the USA and France would receive every right immediately break the agreement that is unfavorable for them. Moreover, Italy and Japan could effectively use such a violation by declaring that England was persuading the leading maritime countries to certain conditions, but then, behind their backs, it was concluding agreements on completely different ones, and that from now on England, as the initiator of international agreements, was not and would not be trusted. Maybe. Worse yet, the same could have been done by Germany, which very recently (in 1935) concluded a naval agreement with England, which the latter’s leadership tried to present to its people as a great political victory.

In other words, if England, when signing a naval treaty with the USSR, had violated the London Treaty of 1936 in some way, then all political efforts in the field of limiting naval armaments would have gone to waste.

England agreed to consider Kirov-class cruisers permitted for construction. Thus, the British de jure recognized that despite the 180-mm caliber, Soviet ships of Project 26 and 26-bis should still be considered light cruisers. At the same time, the British introduced only one, quite reasonable, condition: they insisted on limiting the number of such ships to quotas of heavy cruisers. The USSR received the right to build seven 180 mm ships - i.e. the same number as France had 203 mm cruisers, to whose fleet the USSR fleet was equated according to the Anglo-Soviet agreement. This was logical, since if the number of Kirov-class cruisers allowed for construction were not limited, it would turn out that the USSR received the right to build more powerful light cruisers than England, France and the USA.

It is interesting that neither the United States, nor France, nor anyone in the world tried to protest this decision and did not consider the Project 26 and 26-bis cruisers a violation existing agreements. Thus, the international community agreed with the British interpretation and de facto recognized the Kirov-class cruisers as light.

The question arises. If Soviet naval science and the international community recognized the cruisers of projects 26 and 26-bis as light, then what reason do modern historians have to transfer them to the heavy subclass? Still the same letter of the London Treaty on the 155 mm caliber? And exceeding this parameter by an inch automatically makes the Kirovs heavy cruisers? Okay, then let's look at the issue of classifying Soviet cruisers from a different point of view.

It is well known that the Washington restrictions on cruisers - 10 thousand tons and 203 mm caliber - arose not as a result of the evolution of this class of ships, but generally by accident - at the time of signing the Washington Agreements, England had in its fleet the latest Hawkins cruisers with a displacement of 9.8 thousand tons with seven 190-mm guns in deck mounts, and it was clear that Britain would not send the newly built ships for scrapping.

At that time, these were the largest modern cruisers and Washington’s restrictions were focused specifically on these ships. But the Hawkins, despite all its novelty, represented yesterday's shipbuilding. Completely new types of ships were on the way, with main caliber turret artillery that weighed much more than deck installations. At the same time, the Hawkins were built as a fighter of light cruisers, and as such carried extremely moderate protection, capable of protecting the ship only from 152-mm shells of light cruisers. But everyone rushed to build the “Washington” ten-thousanders, and accordingly the question of meeting the cruisers in battle seriously arose, which required adequate protection from 203-mm shells.

Very quickly, shipbuilders around the world became convinced that creating a harmonious ship with 203 mm guns with a displacement of 10,160 metric tons was impossible - the result was fast, but almost unprotected ships. Then almost all the world's fleets resorted to cheating - they strengthened the performance characteristics of their ships, violating the Washington and London agreements on displacement by one or two thousand tons, or even more. Italian Zara? Standard displacement is 11,870 tons. "Bolzano"? 11,065 tons. American Wichita? 10,589 tons. Japanese "Nachi"? 11,156 tons. "Takao"? 11,350 tons. "Hipper"? In general, 14,250 tons!

None of the above (and many others not mentioned in this list) ships, according to the current international classification, are cruisers. All of them, with a standard displacement of over 10,000 “long” (10,160 metric) tons, are ... battleships. Therefore, focusing on the letter of the treaty, of course, we can recognize the Soviet cruisers of projects 26 and 26 bis as heavy. But in this case, it is completely pointless to compare ships of completely different classes, which, from the point of view of the London Naval Treaty of 1936, are the heavy cruiser Kirov and, for example, the battleship Zara or Admiral Hipper.

The question is not about chicanery, but about the fact that the situations with violation of international treaties are absolutely identical. The Soviet Union was designing a light cruiser, but felt that the 180mm caliber would better suit its mission and thus exceeded the limits for light cruisers according to the international classification. In Italy they designed the heavy cruiser Zara and, to make it more balanced, increased the displacement, thereby exceeding the restrictions for heavy cruisers according to the same international classification. Why should we transfer the Kirov cruiser to the next subclass of cruisers, but at the same time leave the Zara in its class?

To be continued…

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